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ALT-LABOR, SECONDARY BOYCOTTS, AND TOWARD A LABOR
ORGANIZATION BARGAIN
Michael C. Duff

INTRODUCTION
In recent times, low wage non-union workers have staged noteworthy protests and job
actions against alleged inferior working conditions. Protests against Walmart, strikes against fast
food restaurants, and immigration rallies by unauthorized workers offer ready examples. In these
protests and job actions various non-union labor advocacy groups, sometimes collectively
denoted as “ALT-Labor,” have often led the involved workers. 1 This article addresses legal
problems that might arise from ALT-Labor coordination2: when one ALT-Labor group protests on
behalf of or assists another such group.3 Imagine, for example, a situation in which
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1 Some of the groups operate within an entire industry, examples include Restaurant Opportunities Center, the New
York Taxi Drivers’ Alliance, and Domestic Workers United; see Josh Eidelson, ALT-Labor, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT
(January 29, 2013) available at http://prospect.org/article/ALT-Labor; others operate throughout a region premised
on religious or racial justice motivations. See e.g., Arise Chicago (Religious), http://arisechicago.org/, and New
Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice (Racial), https://www.google.com/#q=New+Orleans+Worker+Center. A
single-employer example of such a group is OURWalmart, which has staged work stoppages against Walmart. See
Josh Eidelson, Breaking: Wal-Mart workers on strike, defying firings, Salon (October 18, 2013) available at
http://www.salon.com/2013/10/18/breaking_wal_mart_workers_on_strike_in_florida/. Even a brief review of
Janice Fine’s work will reveal the very broad array of worker center structures. J ANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS:
ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM (2006). Also continuously useful to my purposes is Alan
Hyde’s work on new forms of labor institutions. Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in the
United States: Some Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 385 (2006)
2 See e.g. Micah Uetricht, Retail and Fast Food Workers Strike in Chicago's Magnificent Mile, THE NATION (Apr.
24, 2013) (describing a protest event at Chicago’s “Miracle Mile” participated in by low wage employees of Macy’s,
Subway,
Victoria’s
Secret,
McDonald’s,
Nike,
and
Dunkin
Donuts)
available
at
http://www.thenation.com/article/174016/retail-and-fast-food-workers-strike-chicagos-magnificent-mile#.
The
“miracle mile” event was apparently coordinated by “Fight For 15,” an umbrella group coordinating workers across
employers and industries—the fast food and retail industries. Among “Fight For 15”’s demands is “the right to form
a union without retaliation.” http://fightfor15.org/en/for-workers/.
3 As David Rosenfeld usefully notes ALT-Labor, especially worker centers, actually pre-dates the existence of
unions or modern labor statutes, so it makes some sense that as modern labor law has been effectively dismantled
earlier prototypes of collective labor groups would emerge. See David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers: Emerging Labor
Organizations – Until they Confront the National Labor Relations Act, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & L. LAW 469, 472-74
(2006) (hereinafter Rosenfeld, Worker Centers). A full discussion of the matter is beyond the scope of this article.
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OURWalmart members4 participate in a protest organized by Fast Food Forward5 at the premises
of a fast food restaurant. Imagine further that the OURWalmart members attempt to persuade
fast food workers to strike or customers not to enter the restaurant. In such circumstances the
OURWalmart group could incur very serious legal liability under labor law’s obscure and
complicated “secondary boycott” rules.6 Those rules in essence prohibit “labor organizations”
involved in a labor dispute to pressure in specific proscribed ways “neutrals” to a labor dispute. 7
Thus, if OURWalmart has a dispute with Walmart any pressure it applies to a neutral fast food
restaurant could be subjected to legal scrutiny.
Secondary boycott complications are made more likely by recent escalation of nonunion
ALT-Labor activity. Fast food worker strikes occurring regularly over the last couple of years led
by groups like Fast Food Forward offer a prime example of ALT-Labor in action. On August 29,
2013, workers in sixty cities walked off the job, a significant labor development that followed a
series of smaller such strikes earlier in 2013. 8 The strikes were conducted at McDonald’s,
Burger King, and Kentucky Fried Chicken, and extended to the Southern United States,
historically a region hostile to traditional labor union organizing .9 The impact of the strikes was
mixed: “Some targeted restaurants were temporarily unable to do business because they had too
few employees, and others seemingly operated normally.”10 A second wave of similar strikes
transpired in about one hundred U.S. cities on December 5, 2013.11 The impact of those strikes
was also inconclusive as of this writing though their notoriety is undeniable. 12 The “days without
immigrants” rallies of 2006 provide another example of widespread ALT-Labor protest. 13
4 The group’s website reflects that its mission is “to ensure that every Associate [of Walmart], regardless of his or
her title, age, race, or sex, is respected at Walmart. We join together to offer strength and support in addressing the
challenges that arise in our stores and our company every day.” OURWalmart website available at
http://forrespect.org/our-walmart/about-us/. The acronym “OUR” stands for “Organization United for Respect.”
5 According to the group’s website, “Fast Food Forward is a movement of NYC fast food workers to raise wages
and gain rights at work. It is part of the national movement of low-wage workers fighting for a better future.” See
http://fastfoodforward.org/.
6 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4)(B)
7 See infra. Section I
8 Atossa Araxia Abrahamian, U.S. Fast-Food Workers Protest, Demand A 'Living Wage', Reuters, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/29/us-usa-restaurants-strike-idUSBRE97S05320130829
9 Id.
10 Candice Choi, Fast-Food Workers Stage Largest Protests Yet, ASSOCIATED PRESS, August 29, 2013, available at
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fast-food-protests-under-way (last accessed October 17, 2013)
11 John Bacon, Fast-food workers strike, protest for higher pay, USA TODAY, December 5, 2013, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/12/05/fast-food-strike-wages/3877023/
12 As noted in the New York Times, ALT-Labor activity has definitely gotten the attention of business. Steven
Greenhouse, Advocates for Workers Raise the Ire of Business, N.Y. TIMES (January 16, 2014) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/17/business/as-worker-advocacy-groups-gain-momentum-businesses-fightback.html?hp&_r=1 (last accessed January 18, 2014)
13 I have elsewhere written about the traditional labor law connotations of the rallies. Michael C. Duff, Days
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Immigration issues intensified in the early months of that year following news of a federal
legislative proposal that would have essentially classified all employees working without
required immigration documentation as felons.14 In reaction to the proposed legislation a variety
of ALT-Labor groups, and others, coordinated and organized mass rallies in more than a hundred
U.S. cities.15 The participants included authorized and unauthorized workers and various allies
and supporters of unauthorized workers, including ALT-Labor groups.16 Work in many locations
stopped while the rallies were underway as workers joined the protests. 17 The various campaigns
against Walmart represent another well-known area of ALT-Labor activity.18 The “Black Friday”
protests, organized by OURWalmart, are probably the most widely known of these campaigns. 19
Finally, there has been a recent groundswell of strike activity by low wage employees of federal
government contractors. For example, the group Good Jobs Nation20 in conjunction with a group
of unions coordinated a strike in January of 2014 against contractors of the Pentagon.21
without Immigrants: Analysis and Implications of Immigration Rallies under the National Labor Relations Act, 85
Denver U. L. Rev. 93 (2007)
14 See, e.g., Monica Davey, Protest Rallies End in Job Loss for Immigrants, N.Y. Times, April 15, 2006, at A1 &
Employers Gird for Immigrant Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2006, at A12. Rallies occurred nationwide throughout
this period. Attendance at a rally held on March 25, 2006 in Los Angeles was estimated at between 500,000 and
750,000 protesters. See Jim Newton, Villaraigosa Tells Where He Stands, L.A. TIMES, April 15, 2006, A1; see also
Thousands March for Immigrant Rights: Schools, Businesses Feel Impact as Students, Workers Walk Out,
CNN.Com, May 1, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/01/immigrant.day/index.html (last visited February 12,
2007).
15 Id.
16 Davey, supra., Protest Rallies End in Job Loss
17 See Carol McKinley et al. A Day Without Immigrants, FOX NEWS.COM (May 1. 2006) available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/05/01/day-without-immigrants/
18 The search query “Walmart campaign” will produce many hits in any internet search engine.
19 See e.g. Raya Zimmerman, St. Paul: 26 arrested in Black Friday protests over low retail wages, TWIN CITIES.COM
(November 29, 2013) available at http://www.twincities.com/business/ci_24625449/st-paul-26-arrested-blackfriday-protests-over
20 The group describes itself at its website, at http://goodjobsnation.org/#about, as follows:
We are workers who do important jobs for our nation. We pick and process food for school
children, greet visitors at our National Parks, clean and safeguard government buildings, sew the
uniforms for our troops, haul cargo to military bases, and even answer calls when people have
questions about government benefits, like Social Security . . . We are the workers who are
employed by private companies through federal contracts, concessions and leases. Yet, while our
employers reap billions of dollars in profits from taxpayers every year, we are paid such low
wages that we are unable to afford basic needs such as food, clothing, and even rent . . . We are
uniting to call on the federal government to stop being America’s leading poverty job creator by
paying us living wages and benefits. We are fighting to make America a Good Jobs Nation once
again.
21 Josh Eidelson, Breaking: Pentagon workers strike over poverty pay, SALON (January 22, 2014) available at
http://www.salon.com/2014/01/22/breaking_pentagon_workers_strike_over_poverty_pay/

From the perspective of business the commercial problem presented by non-union ALTLabor protests—especially coordinated protests involving multiple employers—is identical to
that presented by traditional union protests: workplaces may be shut down and customers may be
unable to access businesses while the protests are in progress, outcomes directly threatening
commercial activity.22 Public relations considerations soon come into play. After all, ALT-Labor
protesters are arguing in a very moral and emotional way, often (when the protesters are
employees) at risk of losing their jobs, that they are being treated unfairly.23 The potential for
negative public relations in reaction to the protest is real. 24 The negative perception of businesses
by potential customers, and others in the community, could harm accounting goodwill or other
intangible assets.25 It may be true, as some commentators have argued, 26 that business interests
simply do not care about these kinds of disruptions or perceptions. But historically business
interests have cared about such volatility,27 and have usually desired that labor protests—strikes,

22 Federal labor policy has from its inception been centered on prevention of such threats to the economy. See e.g.,
Section 1 of the NLRA, which reads in pertinent part:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some
employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of
industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing
commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of
commerce; (b) occurring in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or
controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods from or into the
channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in commerce; or (d) causing
diminution of employment and wages in such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the
market for goods flowing from or into the channels of commerce . . .
23 Theodore J. St. Antoine, Keynote Address: The Moral Dimension Of Employment Dispute Resolution, 86 SAINT
JOHN’S L. REV. 391, 402 (“ . . . [C]onstructing a system of dispute resolution, especially when the parties have
unequal bargaining power as is usually true of employers and employees, implicates moral values profoundly.)
24 This explains why the risk of labor disputes is routinely included as a “forward looking information” item on the
financial statements of major corporations involving future risks and uncertainties. Such statements are allowed as a
“Cautionary Statement for Purposes of the ‘Safe Harbor’ Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of
1995.”
See
e.g.
the
statement
of
Pool
Corporation
available
at
http://ir.poolcorp.com/profiles/investor/ResLibraryView.asp?BzID=603&ResLibraryID=66095&Category=43
25 Indeed, employers have been bringing racketeering cases against traditional unions under RICO premised on just
these kinds of interferences with intangible “property,” though the claims are probably meritless. James J. Brudney,
Collateral Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. CAL. L.
REV. 731, 775-776 (pointing out that unions do not attempt to acquire control of employer property within the
meaning of the racketeering statutes — RICO and the Hobbs Act — but to regulate its use through the collective
bargaining process).
26 Brian Solomon, Memo to the Fast Food Minimum Wage Strikers: Investors Don’t Care, FORBES, December 5,
2013
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2013/12/05/fast-food-investors-not-scared-ofminimum-wage-worker-strike/
27 The involvement of business lobbyists like Richard Berman belie the notion that business is unconcerned. See
generally supra n.___, Greenhouse, Advocates for Workers Raise the Ire of Business

picketing, and handbilling—be promptly suppressed.28 This article discusses one method
business might employ to achieve suppression: bringing legal actions on the theory that the ALTLabor coordination constitutes unlawful secondary boycotts.29
In reality, the opening salvo of a skirmish between employers and ALT-Labor that is likely to
intensify quickly has already been fired. On about November 16, 2012, Walmart filed an unfair
labor practice charge against the United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union alleging that “the
union” had engaged in unlawful picketing.30 Although the theory of unlawfulness differed from
the one that will be discussed in this article,31 the charge alleged that “OURWalmart” was a
subsidiary, affiliated organization, or agent of the United Food and Commercial Workers. 32
Although the NLRB informally resolved the charge without having to reach the substance of the
allegations,33 had the case been actively litigated the status of OURWalmart would have to have
been determined. Either it was an agent of the union in connection with the conduct complained
of, or, alternatively, it was a labor organization in its own right, and therefore independently
subject to liability under the NLRA. 34 This article discusses the threshold question of whether
ALT-Labor groups independently possess status as labor organizations under the NLRA in order
to determine whether they are capable of engaging in secondary boycotts.
In Part I of this article I discuss secondary boycotts. ALT-Labor groups cannot violate the
secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA unless they are labor organizations. Thus, in Part II
of the article I engage in extended discussion of the surprisingly complicated question of when a
“group” is an NLRA labor organization subject to the secondary boycott provisions. In Part III,
following up on the preceding section’s discussion of the complexity inherent in determining
whether ALT-Labor groups are labor organizations, I suggest that, in light of the risks occasioned
by unpredictable litigation outcomes, the time may be ripe for a “bipartisan” modification of the
NLRA’s labor organization definition. Anticipating the objection that no modification of labor
28 Indeed, such protest was originally under the common law conceived as simple criminal conspiracy. See
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111 (1842) (rejecting the general view but chronicling well its prevalence in the
mid-19th century)
29 As I will develop in the article, a conclusion of ALT-Labor liability under labor law will turn on whether a group
is a “labor organization.” Assuming a group is a labor organization it is capable of violating a variety of labor laws.
I focus here on violations of the NLRA’s secondary boycott prohibitions under Sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 303 of the
NLRA, as amended. For an exhaustive discussion of the variety of potential violations see Eli Naduris-Weissman,
The Worker Center Movement and Traditional Labor Law, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 232, 263-271 (2009).
[hereinafter Naduris-Weismann, The Worker Center Movement]
30 Lawrence E. Dubé, Wal-Mart Bid To Block ‘Black Friday’ Action Requires Retailer To Prove UFCW’s Objective,
BLOOMBERG LAW available at http://about.bloomberglaw.com/law-reports/wal-mart-bid-to-block-black-friday/
31 My discussion will involve only Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. The Walmart charge alleged that the union and its
“affiliates” engaged in unlawful “recognitional” picketing under Section 8(b)(7) of the NLRA. Id.
32 Id.
33 NLRB Advice Memorandum, United Food & Commercial Workers International Union (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.)
Case 26-CP-093377 (Apr. 10, 2013) available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/26-CP-093377
34 See generally NLRA, as amended. The NLRA by its terms prohibits only “employers” and “labor organizations”
from engaging in specified conduct.

law is likely in light of the omnipresence of legislative gridlock, I underscore that employers
have badly wanted to modify the NLRA labor organization definition for two decades, and
actually achieved a (remarkable) bipartisan modification in 1996, only to see the compromise
vetoed by President Clinton.35 I argue that organized labor may be similarly amenable to
compromise on a narrowing of the labor organization definition in light of ALT-Labor’s
vulnerability to liability under the secondary boycott provisions, of organized labor’s increasing
embrace of ALT-Labor, and of a growing precariat36 that will not be easily organized using
traditional labor organizing principles.
I.

SECONDARY BOYCOTTS

A. Secondary Boycotts & Labor Injunctions

Traditionally, one of the quickest ways for businesses to quash labor protest—besides
summarily firing employee activists37—was to obtain court-issued labor injunctions. 38 However,
this generation of business leaders, coming to age during docile labor times 39 and therefore
having little need to understand traditional labor law, may not realize that obtaining labor
injunctions in the federal courts to suspend peaceful labor activity of the type presently engaged
in by ALT-Labor is typically not possible.40 The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 broadly prohibits
federal courts from issuing such injunctions.41 An important exception to this rule, however, is
that injunctions against “labor organizations”42 remain available for certain conduct specifically
35 WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 85 (Cambridge University Press 5th Ed. 2013)
36 Precariat may be defined as a social group consisting of people whose lives are difficult because they have little
or no job security and few employment rights. MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, BUZZWORD available at
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/buzzword/entries/precariat.html
37 An action now unlawful under 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (1) and/or (3) [Sections 8(a)(1) and/or (3) of the NLRA].
38 F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 201 (The MacMillan Co. 1930)
39 See Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Work Force in a Union Falls to a 97-Year Low, 11.3%, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23,
2013)
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/business/union-membership-drops-despite-jobgrowth.html?_r=0
40 With private sector union density at historic lows—6.6% of the private sector work force and 11.3% of the work
force overall, the lowest rate since 1916, see http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/business/union-membershipdrops-despite-job-growth.html?_r=0 — the risk of strikes and picketing and the law surrounding those activities
would understandably be of diminished interest to the business community.
41 29 U.S.C. §101 et seq. Many states have in effect almost identical “little Norris-LaGuardia Acts,” See Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 12-1808; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-3-118; Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 31-112 et seq; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 380-7; Idaho Code
§ 44-701 et seq.; Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 820 § 5/1 et seq.; Ind. Code § 22-6-1-6; Kan. Stat. § 60-904; La. Rev. Stat. §
23:844; 26 Me. Rev. Stat. § 5; Md. Lab. & Empl. Code § 4-314; Mass. Gen. Laws 214 § 6; Minn. Stat. § 185.13;
N.J. Stat. § 2A:15-51; N.M. Stat. § 50-3-1; N.Y. Lab. ch. 31, art. 22-a, § 807; N.D. Century Code § 34-08-01; Or.
Rev. Stat. § 662.080; 43 Pa. Stat. § 206i; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-10-2; Utah Code U.C.A. § 34-19-1; Wash. Rev. Code
§ 49.32.072; Wis. Stat. § 103.56; Wyo. Stat. § 27-7-101 et seq., and this discussion has in theory broader
applicability under state law but such considerations are beyond the scope of this article.
42 A term that I will define and explore in the next section.

prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act (“the NLRA”). 43 In my judgment the most
important example of NLRA-prohibited conduct44 subject to federal court injunction is the
secondary boycott.45 A secondary boycott—not defined with precision in the NLRA 46—has
traditionally been explained as some combination to influence A by exerting economic or social
pressure against persons with whom A deals.47
Workers may naturally wish to support the causes of other workers. 48 But American labor
law has always sought to prevent general strikes, that is to say simultaneous work stoppages of
workers in all or most industries. 49 Labor organizations are not permitted to expand the “front”
of a labor dispute they may have with one employer, known as the “primary” employer, to the

43 See 29 U.S.C. 160(j) and (l) [NLRA, Sections 10(j) and (l)] (NLRB authorized to seek injunctive relief in federal
district courts generally to temporarily restrain alleged commission of an unfair labor practice under the National
Labor Relations Act and required to seek such relief when it has cause to believe that Sections 8(b)(4) or 8(b)(7) of
the Act has been violated).
44 A full discussion of the Labor Management and Reporting Disclosure Act (LMRDA)-inspired objections to
worker centers are beyond the scope of this discussion. I will say generally that while the definition of labor
organization under the LMRDA seems broader than the NLRA definition, see Stefan J. Marculewicz and Jennifer
Thomas, Labor Organizations by Another Name: The Worker Center Movement and its Evolution into Coverage
under the NLRA and LMRDA, 13 ENGAGE 79 n.166-184 and accompanying text (2012) (hereinafter Marculewicz
and Thomas, Labor Organizations by Another Name] available at https://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/labororganizations-by-another-name-the-worker-center-movement-and-its-evolution-into-coverage-under-the-nlra-andlmrda, it does not appear that Congress considered its application to entities like worker centers when enacting the
LMRDA. See Naduris-Weismann, The Worker Center Movement at 287-291. The question whether that intent
should matter in the context of the statute’s text is of course the typical quandary.
45 Some commentators have focused on the potential for ALT-Labor groups violating the recognitional picketing
provisions of the NLRA, especially in Section 8(b)(7)(C). A full discussion of those provisions is beyond the scope
of this article. As a general proposition, “labor organizations” picketing for “recognition or bargaining” must
comply with a precise regulatory framework or risk violating the NLRA. See generally San Francisco Culinary
Workers. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 794 (1974). However, it may be quite hard to characterize ALT-Labor activity as
having the requisite “recognition or bargaining object.” Protest activity may be protected by the publicity provisos
to Section 8(b)(7) or characterized as “area standards” picketing independently protected by Section 7 of the NLRA.
See Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 207 n. 42 (1978); Hod Carriers
Local 41 (Calumet Contractors Ass’n), 133 NLRB 512 (1961). To my mind, protest activity is, from the employer’s
vantage, more reliably characterized as a secondary boycott. See International Longshoremen’s Association v.
Allied International, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (holding that union’s refusal to handle goods from Soviet Union in
protest of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan violated secondary boycott provisions of NLRA). I do agree, however,
that if an ALT-Labor group is an NLRA labor organization it is capable of violating the recognitional picketing
provisions of the Act. In truth, the labor organization question, see infra, is closely caught up in the question
because a labor organization is more likely in my view to have a recognitional or bargaining objective.
46 Indeed there were no secondary boycott provisions in the first iteration of the NLRA. The Taft-Hartley Act, a
1947 amendment of the NLRA, for the first time added a secondary boycott prohibition in Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the
NLRA as then-amended. United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union Local 1996, 336 NLRB 421, 423-424
(2001). Certain loopholes to the prohibition were closed off as part of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, and the secondary prohibition was refined to its present form and is included in Section 8(b)
(4)(B) of the NLRA, as amended. Id. The LMRDA also independently outlawed in Section 8(e) of the NLRA, as
amended, a specific form of secondary conduct in which a union and a neutral employer agree that the neutral
employer will not handle the products of an employer with whom the union has a primary labor dispute. See EtsHokin Corp.154 NLRB 839 (1965). Throughout these mutations it has remained true “that union pressures
calculated to induce the employees of a secondary employer to withhold their services in order to force their

premises of a “secondary” or “neutral” employer.50 If they do, injunctive relief and damages are
available to such neutral employers in the federal courts to suppress the conduct. 51 Various
policies attempt to justify this limitation, including containing primary labor disputes to
minimize injury to interstate commerce and the notion that is not fair to allow pressuring of a
neutral employer not having the ability or duty to control the labor relations of the involved
union and primary employer.52 If the NLRB finds that a labor organization has engaged in a
secondary boycott it is required (in the absence of very prompt settlement) to seek a temporary
injunction in federal district court to restrain the conduct.53
A labor organization could engage in either of two types of conduct possibly violating
Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA if it is coupled with a prohibited object.54 With respect to the first
type of conduct, it is potentially unlawful for a labor organization “to engage in, or to induce or
encourage any individual employed by any person . . . to engage in, a strike or a refusal . . . to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods . . . or to perform
any services . . .”55 With respect to the second type of conduct, it is potentially unlawful for a
labor organization “to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce.”56 However, for the conduct ultimately to be found unlawful it
must be coupled with a proscribed object. 57 In the case of a secondary boycott, a violation occurs
employer to cease dealing with their employer” are illegal. Local 1996, supra. 336 NLRB at 425.
47 FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 43 (1930). There are of course some who object
to the whole idea of a secondary boycott on strictly moral grounds. Jonathan H. Adler, Secondary Boycotts and the
Breakdown
of
Civil
Society,
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(May
3,
2012)
available
at
http://www.volokh.com/2012/05/03/secondary-boycotts-and-the-breakdown-of-civil-society/
48 See generally Staughton Lynd and Daniel Gross, SOLIDARITY UNIONISM AT STARBUCKS (PM Press 2011)
49 OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/general-strike (last
accessed Jan. 19, 2014). This was a central purpose of the 1946-47 Taft-Hartley reforms, see National Woodwork
Manufacturers Association v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612, 623-25 (1967), though it must be admitted, as Josiah Lambert
has shown, that it is difficult to conceive of the early American state as excessively hostile to any form of strike.
Josiah Bartlett Lambert, IF THE WORKERS TOOK A NOTION 21-23 (Cornell University Press 2005).
50 See Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F.Supp. 672, 677 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1948)
51 ARCHIBALD COX, DEREK CURTIS BOK, ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATHEW W. FINKIN, LABOR LAW: CASES
MATERIALS 691-692 (14th Ed. 2006).

AND

52 See Carpenters Local 1976 (Sand Door) v. N.L.R.B., 357 U.S. 93 (1958)
53 Pursuant to Section 10(l) of the NLRA.
54 The statutory language has been set forth above.
55 Section 8(b)(i)(4) of the NLRA.
56 Section 8(b)(ii)(4) of the NLRA. Both employers and employees are extremely broadly defined in Section 8(b)
(4), effectively discouraging esoteric argument regarding the status of actors in secondary boycott scenarios.
57 There are four proscribed objects under Section 8(b)(4). Here I concern myself solely with the “secondary
boycott” object.

when any of the conduct just mentioned is engaged in with the object of “forcing or requiring
any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of
any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person.”58 Some narrow provisos to the rule exist that are beyond the scope of this discussion.
Thus, to continue with the hypothetical at the beginning of this article, if OURWalmart
pickets at a protest organized by Fast Food Forward at the premises of a fast food restaurant with
the object of persuading fast food workers to strike, or even with the object of forcing any person
to cease doing business with any other person, which of course is the essence of a boycott,
OURWalmart is in jeopardy of violating the NLRA’s secondary boycott provision. OURWalmart
may argue that it is merely protesting the fact that all workers are being paid substandard wages
or working in substandard conditions. But unless it proceeds with great caution in
communicating and investigating the basis for this “area standards” message the NLRB may
nonetheless deem it “secondary” and therefore unlawful.59
If OURWalmart is, for example, suggesting to workers that they should not go to work, or is
persuading customers to boycott a fast food restaurant, a serious “cease doing business” issue
will have arisen, for the underlying presumption of this strictly enforced provision is that
OURWalmart is surreptitiously pressuring a neutral in the hope of indirectly improving working
conditions at Walmart.60 Moreover, the NLRB need only find that an object of OURWalmart is to
cause some person to cease doing business with any other person in order for a violation to be
established.61 Additionally, in some instances a “cease doing business” object may simply be
inferred. In International Longshoremen’s Association v. Allied International,62 for example, the
Supreme Court stated, “When a purely secondary boycott ‘reasonably can be expected to
threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss’ . . . the pressure on secondary parties must
be viewed as at least one of the objects of the boycott or the statutory prohibition would be
rendered meaningless.”63 In other words, if the secondary activity of OURWalmart resulted in

58 NLRA, Section 8(b)(4)(B)
59 Local 7, Sheet Metal Workers International Association, 345 NLRB 1322, 1331 (2005)( “When area standards
picketing is involved, the burden is on the union to first make reasonable inquiry to determine whether or not the
picketed employer is meeting area standards, wages, and benefits. Otherwise, the purported purpose of area
standards picketing may be deemed pretextual, and evidence of improper motive found.”)
60 See Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 905, 908 (2005)
61 N.L.R.B. v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1951)
62 456 U.S. 212 (1982)
63 Id. at 224.

“substantial loss”64 to the “neutral” fast food restaurant, an unlawful secondary object would very
likely be presumed.65
When it has been found that a labor organization has violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the
NLRA, say by picketing a neutral employer, by striking and enlisting employees employed by a
different employer to also strike, or by persuading customers of an employer not their own to
refrain from doing business with that employer, a Regional Director of the NLRB is required to
seek injunctive relief in a district court, even when the secondary picketing is peaceful. 66 If the
court grants the injunction, there are at least two significant consequences. First, all present
secondary picketing must cease, with severe sanctions, including the possibility of criminal
liability, attaching for violations of the injunction. 67 Second, as a practical matter, strikes or any
other labor activity will likely be “broken” by an injunction, as has been known for more than a
century.68 If federal courts embarked on a course of enjoining ALT-Labor the probable response
of protesting employees—especially those without the benefit of the elucidating legal counsel
unions might be expected to enjoy—would be to sharply curtail protest activity.
B. Secondary Boycotts & Civil Damages

In addition to the risk of injunction, the NLRA, as amended in Section 303 of the Labor
Management Relations Act,69 provides employers with a private right of action for compensatory
64 In an earlier case, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 [Tree Fruits], 377 U.S. 58
(1964), the Court held that certain unions did not violate Section 8(b)(4) when they limited secondary picketing of
retail stores to appeals to customers not to buy the products of firms against which one of the unions was on strike.
The Court found that consumer picketing of the neutral retailer was permissible unless “employed to persuade
customers not to trade at all with the secondary employer.” Id. at 72. The Safeco case, cited by the Court in ILA,
altered the Tree Fruits rule by holding that “[p]roduct picketing that reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral
parties with ruin or substantial loss simply does not square with the language of the purpose of [section] 8(b)(4)(ii)
(B).” Safeco, 447 U.S. at 614-15.
65 This interpretation appears to read the “object” requirement out of the statute entirely. The conclusion begs the
question of whether the injured employers are truly neutral because the Court failed to identify any object on the part
of the union to do injury to them, which is the statutory predicate. The conclusion is actually the fruition of
developments begun much earlier with cases focusing on injuries to neutrals in the context of limited “object
evidence.” See e.g. N.L.R.B. v. Carpenters District Council of New Orleans, 407 F.2d 804, 806 (C.A. La. 1969)
(though statute in fact requires cease doing business object, objective to cause “serious disruption to existing
business relationship” sufficient to satisfy statutory requirement). In ILA, and as the union argued, there was not a
“primary” at all, so the primary-neutral distinction was completely collapsed, and reference to statutory “neutrals”
was a legal fiction. See ILA, Petitioner’s Brief at 28-9, 1980 WL 390100. While in mixed object scenarios a labor
organization will be found to have engaged in unlawful secondary activity where only one of its objects is
proscribed by the NLRA, NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, supra., 341 US at 689, the
courts have relaxed even that forgiving standard by whittling away its predicate to a skeletal core requiring merely
that the possibility of the fruit of an unlawful object – even an unintended one - be foreseen.
66 NLRA, Section 10(l)
67 Ahmed A. White, The Crime of Staging an Effective Strike, Working USA: THE JOURNAL OF LABOR AND SOCIETY,
Volume 11, 31-33 (2008) available at http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/pubpdfs/white/White11WUSA.pdf
68 JULIE GREENE, PURE AND SIMPLE POLITICS: THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM, 18811917, 84-85 (Cambridge University Press 2004)
69 The Labor Management Relations Act is the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act

damages arising from secondary activity found by a federal district court to violate Section 8(b)
(4) of the NLRA.70 The availability of court-awarded civil damages in this context is an anomaly
of the American labor law system in which most adjudication occurs in administrative agencies
and compensatory damages are unavailable.71 Section 303 declares that anyone injured in
business or property by a secondary boycott possesses a private right of action for damages. 72
The provision renders any “labor organization” violating the secondary boycott prohibition of
Section 8(b)(4)(B) broadly liable for damages and the cost of suit in connection with the
violation.73 Employers may recover business losses caused by a labor organization's peaceful but
unlawful secondary activities.74 Section 303 may arguably also act as a kind of protection to
ALT-Labor because it preempts state law actions for damages premised on a peaceful secondary
boycott theory.75 Nevertheless, under Section 303 ALT-Labor groups are exposed to civil liability
for damage to business relationships; for loss of business profits; for idled equipment; and for
additional personnel required to operate a business during the period of an illegal work stoppage.
Punitive damages are unavailable, however.76
Interestingly, to the extent that an ALT-Labor group was found to be an agent of a union
rather than a labor organization in its own right there is developing authority that it would not be
liable under Section 303.77
To consider how this provision might operate let us modify some of the facts of our earlier
ALT-Labor hypothetical. This time, let us imagine that Fast Food Forward members appear at a
local Walmart in support of an OURWalmart protest. Imagine further that the protest is
extremely successful and that many customers decline to cross the ALT-Labor “picket lines.” 78 If
a federal district court concluded that a “labor organization” had “threaten[ed], coerce[ed], or
restrain[ed] any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce” 79 with the
and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. Pub. L. No. 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, 61
Stat. 136, as amended by Pub. L. No. 257, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959; 29 U.S.C. §§141-67, 201-97, F.C.A. 29 §§
141-67, 201-97
70 Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258 (1964)
71 See generally Section 10 of the NLRA
72 LMRA § 303
73 Id.
74 Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964).
75 See Labor-Ready Inc. v. Tri-State Building and Construction Trades Council, 2001 WL 1358708 (S.D.W.Va.),
168 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2642
76 See Archibald Cox, Derek Curtis Bok, et al., Labor Law: Cases and Materials 771 (Foundation Press, 14th Ed.)
77 Jung Sun Laundry Group Corp. v. Laundry, Dry Cleaning, & Allied Workers Joint Bd., 2010 WL 4457135 citing
Wild Edibles Inc. v. Indus. Workers of World Local 460/640, No. 07 Civ. 9225, 2008 WL 4548392, slip op. at 3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2008).
78 Picketing does not necessarily require the customary stick and placard; patrolling will suffice.
79 See supra. n.49 and accompanying text

object of “forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease
doing business with any other person”80 the ALT-Labor group could be liable for the loss of
business occasioned by the action. It might also be liable for other compensatory costs involving
items such as personnel modifications, inventory control, enhanced on site security, and so forth.
It does not require a great deal of imagination to think of ways in which these costs could
escalate and be very difficult to bear by an ALT-Labor group.
II.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

A. Introductory Remarks on the Labor Organization Question

Secondary boycott prohibitions apply only to labor organizations.81 If ALT-Labor groups are
not labor organizations they are not bound by the NLRA’s secondary boycott provisions and the
groups’ peaceful labor protest activities are likely immune from federal court injunctions. 82
Employers and their allies have in the main 83 been skirting the question of whether ALT-Labor
groups are themselves labor organizations by arguing that unions are “behind” ALT-Labor and
that ALT-Labor should therefore be bound to labor rules binding unions. 84 The role of unions in
encouraging ALT-Labor is becoming well known;85 and the connection between unions and ALTLabor groups like worker centers is openly acknowledged and embraced by the AFL-CIO. 86
Tellingly, the AFL-CIO underscores that its increasingly formalizing relationship with worker
centers began in 2006, the year in which the massive “days without immigrants” rallies

80 See supra. n.51 and accompanying text
81 See generally Section 8(b)(4)(B)
82 Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429 (1987) (holding
that in the absence of specific Congressional authorization to the contrary the Norris LaGuardia Act prevents federal
courts from issuing labor injunctions in peaceful labor disputes).
83 But see generally Marculewicz and Thomas, Labor Organizations by Another Name (discussing the precise
question in detail)
84 See e.g. Kevin Bogardus, Chamber takes aim at worker centers, THE HILL (November 20, 2013) available at
http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/191011-chamber-takes-aim-at-worker-centers-over-funding (last accessed
December 10, 2013)
85 The Center for Union Facts has been engaged in a reasonably successful campaign to make the connection
known to the general public. See e.g. Richard Berman, Worker centers: A Backdoor for Unions, U.S. News & World
Report,
News
Opinion,
Op-Ed
(October
14,
2013)
available
at
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/10/14/worker-centers-are-just-a-backdoor-for-unions
86 See AFL-CIO, Worker Center Partnerships available at http://www.aflcio.org/About/Worker-Center-Partnerships;
at the recent AFL-CIO convention there was much discussion of the strengthening ties between organized labor and
ALT-Labor. See Mark Vorpahl, At AFL-CIO Convention, Leaders Ask: What Direction for Labor?, TRUTHOUT (Sep.
11, 2013) available at http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/18769-at-afl-cio-convention-leaders-ask-whatdirection-for-labor

transpired. Unions have fairly consistently provided expertise and counsel to ALT-Labor. 87 Still,
the involvement of unions in ALT-Labor is complex and vague by historical labor movement
standards,88 and often community groups, worker centers, and other non-union advocacy groups
are as a practical matter in the lead of the tactics if not always the financing of ALT-Labor
protests.89 This does not mean of course that ALT-Labor is not receiving considerable assistance
from unions. But there is a good deal of evidence that many “activist charitable foundations,” to
borrow the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s term for the groups, 90 have been heavily funding ALTLabor, and in particular worker centers. 91 The Department of Labor has apparently also directly
funded worker centers.92 All of this complexity makes it much more difficult to agree with any
simplistic formulation that “unions are behind” worker centers or other ALT-Labor groups. Such
funding, moreover, implicates broader civil society protest and nudges the context of ALT-Labor
slightly away from traditional, unmixed labor activism. For example, it is easier to conceive of
an ALT-Labor group funded by the Ford Foundation as a social activist group than it is to see a
group funded and directed exclusively by the United Food and Commercial Workers Union as
one.
The inchoate, elusive involvement of unions in ALT-Labor—as opposed to their direct,
unabashed, traditional involvement—has multiple explanations. The notoriously high employee
turnover rate93 of low wage workers makes them especially hard for unions to organize using
87 See, e.g., Teresa Watanabe and Joe Mathews, Unions Helped to Organize `Day without Immigrants', Los Angeles
Times (May 3, 2006) available at http://articles.latimes.com/2006/may/03/local/me-organizers3; Josh Eidelson,
Walmart Asks a Judge to Block Historic Strikes, THE NATION, November 19, 2012 available at
http://www.thenation.com/blog/171348/walmart-asks-judge-block-historic-strikes. With respect to the more recent
December 5, 2013, fast food strikes, news outlets freely reported that the Service Employees International Union
was “leading” an informal cluster of labor advocates. See Bacon, Fast-food workers strike
88 Interview by Jaisal Noor with Leo Panitch, Canada Research Chair in Comparative Political Economy, York
University, in Baltimore Md., THE REAL NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 4, 2013) available at
http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=11136
(last
accessed December 10, 2013)
89 Jarol B. Manheim, The Emerging Role of Worker Centers in Union Organizing: A Strategic Assessment (U.S.
Chamber
of
Commerce
Working
Paper,
November
2013)
available
at
http://www.workforcefreedom.com/sites/default/files/WFI%20Manheim%20Study%2011-21-2013.pdf (hereinafter
“Chamber of Commerce Paper”) (describing also Sam Ross-Brown, Labor Gets Militant, UTNE READER (February
22, 2013) available at http://twww.utnereader.com/politics/labor-gets-militant.aspx#axzz2n8yUKWKk (“Although
[ALT-Labor at Walmart] relied on support from recognized unions like the United Food and Commercial Workers
(UFCW), their grievances, demands, tactics, and victories were entirely their own.”)
90 Chamber of Commerce Paper at 13
91 Id. The Chamber of Commerce Paper identifies many such charitable organizations including such notable
groups as the Ben & Jerry’s Foundation, the Marguerite Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Kresge
Foundation. Id. at 15-20.
92 Id. at 21.
93 Arindrajit Dube, T. William Lester, and Michael Reich, Minimum Wage Shocks, Employment Flows and
Labor Market Frictions, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper No. 149-13 (July 2013)
available at http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/149-13.pdf.

traditional union organizing methods.94 Workers often voluntarily depart from a low wage
workplace before they can be organized.95 Unauthorized workers fired during traditional union
organizing campaigns are not entitled to remedies under the NLRA following the Supreme
Court’s edict in Hoffman Plastic Compounds,96 making immigrant workers understandably
reluctant to openly support a union.97 In the current extremely difficult legal terrain for
organizing, unions may be correspondingly reluctant to devote full resources to organizing low
wage workers, but may be very willing to render some lesser level of assistance, especially
where outside charitable organizations are contributing to the cause. Unions may also be better
able to face workers in unsuccessful campaigns outside of the traditional labor organizing drive.
Low wage workers seem anecdotally to understand that the possibility of failure in nontraditional
drives is high and that they are involved in a Sysephean struggle in which “we have nothing to
lose.”98 The gambit may be understood from the beginning to be desperate, and the union seems
less likely to be blamed if it fails.
Sinister explanations abound when there is any union involvement in ALT-Labor. Space
permits only discussion of a few. Commentators assert that unions are using worker centers to
insulate themselves from labor law liability.99 Under the National Labor Relations Act, unions,
as acknowledged labor organizations, are proscribed from engaging in certain conduct. 100
Commentators allege that unions evade such proscriptions by acting through ALT-Labor.101 This
curious argument assumes that unions would deliberately expose potential future members to
94 See Molly Korab, Can Fast-Food Workers Raise Wages With One-Day Strikes?, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 2, 2013)
available
at
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114147/fast-food-workers-one-day-strike-and-future-labororganizing (quoting Nelson Lichtenstein: “You have 200-300 percent turnover in the fast food industry”)
95 Eduardo Porter, Unionizing the Bottom of the Pay Scale, N. Y. TIMES, December 4, 2012 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/business/unionizing-at-the-low-end-of-the-pay-scale.html?
pagewanted=1&_r=0&ref=business.
96 See Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. N.L.R.B, 535 U.S. 137 (2002),
97 Hoffman may in the final analysis turn out to have had more symbolic than actual impact because of the limited
nature of labor law remedies but the symbol has been lasting and powerful. See Ruben J. Garcia, Ten Years After
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: The Power of a Labor Law Symbol, 21 Cornell J. of Law & Pub. Pol’y
659, 669-674 (2012).
98 Steven Greenhouse, A Day’s Strike Seeks to Raise Fast-Food Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 31, 2013) (quoting Columbia
political science professor Dorian T. Warren, “Many are earning so little they have nothing to lose.”) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/business/strike-for-day-seeks-to-raise-fast-food-pay.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0
99 See Kris Maher, Nonunion Worker Advocacy Groups under Scrutiny, WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 24, 2013)
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323971204578626283846775530.
100 See generally NLRA, Section 8(b)
101 The Center on Union Facts allegations more or less capture the full scope of the allegations. That group claims
that, “[Worker centers’] legal status allows them to dodge all of the financial transparency, governance and
organizational regulations established by federal law. There are no officer elections, no annual financial filings with
the federal government and no guarantees that they're acting on behalf of the employees they claim to represent.”
See also Marculewicz & Thomas, Labor Organizations by Another Name, notes 5-12 and accompanying text

surrogate legal liability.102 Less curious is the argument that unions, in acting through ALTLabor, are simply avoiding a purportedly “tainted” union “brand.”103 According to the argument,
the heart strings might be more readily pulled by the cause of unaffiliated low wage restaurant
workers than by the unsavory image of union organizers or supporters. The point is debatable.104
Whether ALT-Labor groups are de facto agents of unions is in any event of questionable
legal significance. A union may lawfully organize employees and employees may lawfully assist
unions; organization and representation of employees by unions are the most basic of protected
activities under the NLRA.105 Whether unions provide to employees or receive from employees
organizing assistance directly or through intermediaries appears immaterial. Employees
independently possess NLRA rights to engage in concerted activities under the NLRA. 106 They
may choose to exercise the rights with the guidance and technical direction of an organization or
not.107 Union assistance of employees to exercise rights through ALT-Labor amounts to no more
than any actor helping workers to obtain rights they already possess under the NLRA. “Labor
organizations,” however, are regulated under both the NLRA and the LMRDA, and are required
to operate by certain rules, whatever the rights possessed by employees. 108 Unions as labor
organizations are undeniably required to adhere to these rules. Ultimately, it is only when
102 Even the Chamber of Commerce Paper seems to struggle with explaining the motivation.
In the purest sense, this type of organization [worker center’s clearly functioning as mere surrogates for
unions] may not be a worker center at all, but merely another in a series of secondary mechanisms for
building alliance structures or appealing for public approbation while obscuring somewhat the union label,
presumably because the union strategists find such limiting of transparency advantageous for some reason.
Chamber of Commerce Paper at 35. (Emphasis supplied).
It is far easier for me to accept that unions are beginning to agree with Michael LeRoy’s argument that employee
participation in alternative forms of employee representation could help individuals develop “political skills and
voice functions” that may serve as a precursor to unionization. See Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in
the New Millennium: Redefining a Labor Organization Under Section 8(a)(2) Of The NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
1651, 1703 (1999) [hereinafter LeRoy, Employee Participation].
103 Chamber of Commerce Paper at 35
104 The marketing strategy, if that is what it is, could have questionable underpinnings because just over one-half of
major poll respondents presently have a positive view of unions. Harold Meyerson, The State of Unions, THE
AMERICAN PROSPECT (July 8, 2013) available at http://prospect.org/article/state-unions-0
105 See generally NLRA, Section 7
106 Section 7 of the NLRA states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . .
107 Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S. 9 (1962)
108 See in particular NLRA Section 8(b) & LMRDA Sections 102, 209 & 210

violation of the rules are at issue that questions of agency have any legal significance. The more
difficult question is whether ALT-Labor groups are capable of violating these rules in their own
right and not as the agents of unions.109
B. The Labor Organization Analysis

The question, therefore, is whether ALT-Labor groups are labor organizations in their own
right. Under the NLRA, the term labor organization is defined as:
. . . [A]ny organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.110
ALT-Labor groups are surely “organizations of any kind” almost of necessity having as their
purpose, or as part of their purpose, addressing in some manner employee grievances, advancing
the cause of employees in labor disputes, and improving employee wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.111 It may not always be as clear, however, that ALT-Labor
groups have the purpose of addressing those statutorily enumerated work-related issues by

109 For example, in response to ALT-Labor activities leading up to and planned for Black Friday 2012 Walmart filed
charges against the United Food and Commercial Workers Union even though the activities in question involved, at
least on the surface of things, the ALT-Labor group OURWalmart, apparently because it was unsure of the legal
status of OURWalmart. See http://about.bloomberglaw.com/blaw2/files/2013/01/Walmart-8b7C-charge.pdf
110 Section 2(5) NLRA; 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
111 See e.g. the “front page” of the OURWalmart website available at http://forrespect.org/ in which it describes for
the public how it has communicated its mission to Walmart management:
 Listen to us, the Associates
 Have respect for the individual
 Recognize freedom of association and freedom of speech
 Fix the Open Door policy
 Pay a minimum of $13/hour and make full-time jobs available for Associates who want them
 Create dependable, predictable work schedules
 Provide affordable healthcare
 Provide every Associate with a policy manual, ensure equal enforcement of policy and no discrimination,
and give every Associate equal opportunity to succeed and advance in his or her career
 Provide wages and benefits that ensure that no Associate has to rely on government assistance.
Adopting this Declaration will make Walmart a better company for Associates, customers and the communities
in which it operates. As Sam Walton said, “Share your profits with all your Associates, and treat them as
partners.”

“dealing with” employers,112 and I turn now to that prickly subject. 113 Black’s Dictionary defines
purpose as “an objective, goal, or end.”114 Regrettably, the NLRA does not define purpose. Not
surprisingly, therefore, one is led into the traditional morass of determining whether an
“objective, goal, or end” has been happily and explicitly stated or, more problematically, must be
inferred from surrounding conduct.
1. Express versus Inferred Dealing With Purpose

ALT-Labor organizations containing explicit statements within their charters acknowledging
their purpose as “dealing with” employers over the 2(5) statutory subjects would find it difficult
to argue that they did not possess such a purpose. 115 However, explicit avowal of a dealing with
purpose is not required under the NLRA to establish that a group falls under the definition of
labor organization. In N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Co.,116 the Supreme Court established that the
purpose of a putative labor organization may be discovered not merely with reference to the
organization’s stated purpose, but also by determining what in reality the organization does.117 In
that case multiple affiliated employers had established and supported certain “employee
committees” in several plants.118 The committees had as their explicitly written purpose “meeting
regularly with management to consider and discuss problems of mutual interest, including
grievances, and of handling “grievances at nonunion plants and departments.” 119 In addition to
this explicit expression of purpose it was also obvious that the established committees made
112I do not dwell here to consider whether employees participate in the ranks of ALT-Labor groups. Obviously if
they did not in a particular group that would militate against a finding of labor organization status. The employee
participation requirement would presumably be easily met because ALT-Labor groups seem to go to lengths to
explain the inclusive nature of their organizations. See n.97 supra. Also see Fast Food Forward’s description of
itself available at http://fastfoodforward.org/: “Fast Food Forward is a movement of NYC fast food workers to raise
wages and gain rights at work. It is part of the national movement of low-wage workers fighting for a better future.
When we make enough to live - instead of barely getting by - our community and economy benefit”.
113 I am much indebted throughout this discussion to the work of Eli Naduris-Weismann, who has very thoroughly
analyzed the labor organization question in the context of worker centers. Naduris-Weismann, The Worker Center
Movement_______
114 BLACKS’ DICTIONARY (9th Edition 2009)
115 See Thompson Ramo Woolridge, Inc., 132 NLRB 993, 994 (1961) modified on other grounds and enforced, 305
F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962) (“The best evidence of the purpose of the Association [found to be a 2(5) labor organization]
may be found in its charter and bylaws.”)
116 360 U.S. 203 (1959)
117 Id. at 213. The NLRB has had occasion to underscore this point. In Electromation, 309 NLRB 990 (1992), a
case in which non-union employee committees were found to be labor organizations under the NLRA, the NLRB
stated, “Purpose is a matter of what the organization is set up to do, and that may be shown by what the organization
actually does.” Id. at 996. See also Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 NLRB 1110, 1113 (1995).
118 N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Co., supra. 360 U.S. at 205-206.
119 Id. at 205

many types of work-related proposals that were actively considered by management. 120 Thus, the
Court observed, “Consideration of the declared purposes and actual functions of these
Committees shows that they existed for the purpose, in part at least, ‘of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work.’”121 It is possible to argue in a similar fashion that ALT-Labor groups satisfy the
“purpose” element when their actual functions demonstrate that they exist at least in part for the
purpose of dealing with employers even where their foundational charters or mission statements
express no such purpose.
It may be necessary, therefore, to consider whether ALT-Labor groups’ actual activities reveal
their “dealing with” purpose when no such purpose is explicitly revealed.
That consideration may allow the NLRB, or a court, to in effect construct the purpose element.
The NLRB has at times been confusingly obsessed, however, with arguing that a group is not a
labor organization because it has found insufficient evidence to construct a “dealing with”
purpose from the functions and activities of the group even where an explicit purpose is
manifest.122 As I have argued elsewhere, this overemphasis can be a distraction when explicit
evidence of purpose exists and therefore no reason exists for post hoc ergo propter hoc
inference.123 For example, the Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York, a group concerning
which I have written previously,124 at one time behaved like a statutory labor organization
because it routinely negotiated with employers on behalf of employees. 125 The NLRB’s Division
120 Id. at 207-208: “During the period here involved (from May 1954 to the date of the hearing before the Board in
June 1956), the Employee Committees, in addition to considering and discussing with respondents' plant officials
problems of the nature covered by the bylaws, made and discussed proposals and requests respecting many other
aspects of the employee relationship, including seniority, job classifications, job bidding, makeup time, overtime
records, time cards, a merit system, wage corrections, working schedules, holidays, vacations, sick leave, and
improvement of working facilities and conditions. Respondents' plant officials participated in those discussions and
in some instances granted the Committees' requests.”
121 Id. at 213
122 Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York (Redeye Grill; Firemen Hospitality Group Café Concepts;
Restaurant Daniel), “ROC-NY,” Cases 2-CP-1071 and 2-CB-20643, General Counsel Advice Memorandum
(November 30, 2006).
123 Duff, Days without Immigrants at 134-136
124 See Duff, Days without Immigrants at 135; see also Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in
the United States: Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 417 (2005)
125 In recent years the group has understandably become much more careful in its public relations not to claim that
it is bargaining on behalf of employees. But consider the phenomenon of the “restaurant industry roundtable” touted
on the group’s web site:
The New York City Restaurant Industry Roundtable is a collaboration of restaurant owners,
workers, government agencies, city officials, and ROC-NY. The group meets regularly to provide
valuable services and information to each other, as well as develop strategies that help restaurants
take the “high road” to profitability. All New York City restaurants are encouraged to learn about
and become a part of the Roundtable; the information and services offered are vitally important to
the success of any restaurant. In addition, the roundtable provides valuable support for an
employer striving to become a High Road restaurant.

of Advice found that it was not a labor organization, however, because “ROC-NY’s conduct has
not been shown to constitute a pattern or practice of dealing over time. Rather, ROC-NY's
attempts to negotiate settlement agreements with the Employers here were discrete, nonrecurring transactions with each Employer.” The first difficulty with this statement is that the
Supreme Court made abundantly clear in Cabot Carbon that a group need not be collectively
bargaining to achieve labor organization status, and, as I will discuss momentarily, “pattern and
practice of dealing over time” sounds a lot like collective bargaining.126 Even more
problematically, whatever an ALT-Labor group may be doing functionally is not of greater
significance than an explicit avowal of “dealing with” purpose, which I continue to believe was
the situation when the NLRB previously considered ROC-NY’s labor organization status in
2006.127 Thus, assessing groups’ actions as evidence of purpose should not be controlling when
an explicit “dealing with” purpose must reasonably be conceded.
In the context of broadly inferring a dealing with purpose the NLRB has determined that
minimal contacts between a labor “group” is usually insufficient to establish that the group is a
labor organization. The confusion comes when attempting to determine first, whether any
bilateral activity between a group and an employer must be demonstrated to show that a group is
a statutory labor organization; and, second, what the nature of that bilateral activity must be.
Relatively recent NLRB authority, for example, has held that some “bilateral mechanism”
between a putative labor organization and “target” employer must be established before the
agency will find that labor organization status has been established. 128 The bilateral mechanism
The round table seems at least on the surface to be an instance of ROC-NY dealing with employers within the
meaning of Section 2(5). I cannot think why the presence of government officials should alter the conclusion.
Furthermore, this makes sense. Manifestly advocacy organizations must eventually communicate actual proposals
to their antagonists, either directly or through intermediaries.
126 Cabot Carbon at 211-212: “It is therefore quite clear that Congress, by adopting the broad term ‘dealing’ and
rejecting the more limited term ‘bargaining collectively,’ did not intend that the broad term ‘dealing with’ should be
limited to and mean only ‘bargaining with’ as held by the Court of Appeals.” As Alan Hyde wrote presciently,
In my opinion, worker centers like the Workplace Project, and worker groups like ROC-NY, are
quite likely to be statutory labor organizations. They do indeed raise grievances with particular
employers on behalf of particular employees. Even if this is not collective bargaining, it is similar
to activity that has been held to constitute the activity of dealing with employers. Moreover, it is
hard to come up with any compelling policy reason why such groups should be exempt from
disclosure requirements, or restrictions such as the thirty-day limit on organizational picketing that
bind more traditional unions. Hyde, New Institutions at 408-409.
127 As I wrote back in 2007, a visit to the then-existing ROC-NY web site showed the organization claimed that
over the prior two years it had engaged in six campaigns against employers for back wages and discrimination
claims for food service workers; negotiated a settlement for workers from a Brooklyn deli; and negotiated a
settlement with a restaurant involving “compensation for discrimination, paid vacations, promotions, the firing of an
abusive waiter, and a posting in the restaurant guaranteeing workers the right to organize and the involvement of
ROC-NY in the case of any future discrimination.” The group also advertised to employees: “If you are a restaurant
worker who has problems with your employer, call us or come by ROC-NY!” Duff, Days without Immigrants at
135. I continue to contend that this is an explicit admission that ROC-NY existed for the purpose in whole or in part
of dealing with employers.
128 Syracuse University, 350 NLRB 755 (2007); E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 311 NLRB 893, 894 (1993);
Electromation, 309 NLRB 990, 995 n.21 (1992) enfd. 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994)

must involve exchanges of proposals on 2(5) subjects from the organization coupled with real or
apparent consideration of those proposals by management. 129 The bilateral “mechanism”
ordinarily entails a “pattern or practice” in which a group that employees participate in, over
time, makes proposals to management, and management responds to those proposals by
acceptance or rejection by word or deed:
If the evidence establishes such a pattern or practice, or that the group exists for a
purpose of following such a pattern or practice, the element of dealing is present.
However, if there are only isolated instances in which the group makes ad hoc
proposals to management followed by a management response of acceptance or
rejection by word or deed, the element of dealing is missing.130
This attempted line drawing between a bilateral proposal “pattern and practice mechanism”
and statutory “bargaining” is not a clear one and feels clumsy at times. It is outright confusing to
say that a statutory labor organization may be found without “bargaining” but that a “pattern and
practice of exchanging proposals over time” is required to find that a group is a labor
organization. That is the stuff of Scholastic Philosophy and in pretty obvious tension with Cabot
Carbon. Furthermore, there is little indication that the NLRB intends to cease speaking in this
way any time soon.131 But this is not the NLRB’s doing. The space between collective bargaining
and “dealing with” is on its statutory face a semantic smidgen. It is often true, of course, that
collective bargaining usually has as its goal the negotiation of a comprehensive collective
bargaining agreement,132 while bilateral discussions—even over time—may have narrower
objectives. The problem, however, is that the NLRA’s definition of “bargaining in good faith” is
so broad that it begins to merge imperceptibly with the NLRB’s “pattern and practice” invention.
Section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA make it in an unfair labor practice for an employer or a
labor organization, respectively, to refuse to bargain in good faith over terms and conditions of
employment. Section 8(d) of the NLRA,
[R]equires the parties to ‘meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement.’ This requirement has been interpreted as
establishing a general duty between an employer and its employees' bargaining
representative ‘to enter into discussion with an open and fair mind, and a sincere
purpose to find a basis of agreement.’133

129 Electromation, Inc., supra. 309 NLRB at 995 fn. 21.
130 E.I. Du Pont, supra. 311 NLRB at 894
131 Danite Sign Company, 356 NLRB No. 124 , n.1, slip op. at 2 (2011); Polaroid Corp., 329 NLRB 424, 429-432
(1999)
132 See e.g. Cabot Carbon, supra., 360 U.S. at 213
133 Bryant & Stratton Business Institute, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 140 F.3d 169, 182 (2d Cir. 1998)

Logically under Cabot Carbon a group might be found a labor organization even if it does
not do any of the things described under Section 8(d). Equally logically, under the NLRB’s
formulation a group will not be found a labor organization unless its relationship with an
employer amounts to a “bilateral mechanism of pattern and practice over time.” The NLRB’s
pattern and practice interpretation has thus far inured to ALT-Labor’s benefit in that is has found
certain groups not have that kind of a durable relationship with any particular employer. 134 As a
practical matter a finding of “no labor organization status” means no ALT-Labor liability under
any NLRA prohibitions applicable to labor organizations.135
However, it is often risky business to hang one’s hat on the NLRB’s statutory interpretations
given the reality of hostile appellate review.136 The tension between the Supreme Court’s
discussion of labor organization status and the NLRB’s discussion of it is palpable. So long as
the NLRB is acting as prosecutor in deciding, for example, whether an ALT-Labor group has a
“dealing with” purpose rendering it liable for Section 8(b)(4)(B) violations, all may be well and
good, as it will have discretion whether to issue an administrative complaint, 137 though this

134 Cite to ROC NY memo and any other “no go” doc. Check Federalist memo.
135 For a discussion of other potential 8(b) violations see
136 See Ellen Dannin, Hoffman Plastics as Labor Law: Equality at Last for Immigrant Workers?, U. SAN. FRAN. L.
REV. 393, 394 (explaining that the written labor law as it is applied today is a product of many years of “judicial
amendments.”)
137 See generally Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985) (concluding that an agency’s decision not to enforce
is unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act and the common law of judicial review); NLRB v. UFCW,
Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 124 (1987); however, where a statute possess provisions requiring enforcement action in
specified circumstances a court has meaningful standards to apply concerning a non-enforcement decision and is
authorized to undertake judicial review. Heckler v. Chaney, supra., 470 U.S at 833.

principle has its limits.138 With the exception of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Waugh Chapel
South,139 there is precious little authority on the question of what labor organization analysis
federal courts would apply in Section 303 actions, and that is where real trouble may lurk for
ALT-Labor. District court judges in that venue may be much more inclined to apply Cabot
Carbon as an open-ended vacuum machine indiscriminately inhaling ALT-Labor groups. The
NLRB’s “pattern and practice over time” formulation, though accepted by the Fourth Circuit,
cannot comfortably be seen as a majority judicial approach to the labor organization question.
How did the NLRB’s focus on “pattern and practice” develop? One suspects Cabot Carbon’s
discussion of “pattern and practice” issues throughout the opinion, a discussion it might be
argued was obiter dictum, had the possibly unintended consequence of underemphasizing that
the case most strongly turned on its finding of an express purpose. To see how this thinking can
go awry consider the following thought experiment. Imagine a workplace “committee” in which
employees clearly participate and which equally clearly states in its charter that it exists for the
purpose of bargaining with the employer in that workplace regarding wages. The statute says
nothing about the additional requirement that it actually deal with the employer regarding wages.
Cabot Carbon does not so hold. Rather, it permits a fact finder to evaluate what the group does
as part of the overall analysis. It strains credulity to claim that a group does not exist for the
reason its founding documents say it exists.
The NLRB itself has acknowledged in several cases that it is unnecessary to infer a dealing
with purpose from pattern and practice when it can otherwise be determined; it simply has not
applied the principle consistently. In Coinmach Laundry,140 a representation case, the NLRB
upheld without discussion a Regional Director’s determination that a group started by three
138 Id. Under Section 10(l) a Regional Director is required to seek an injunction when there is reasonable cause to
believe that the NLRA has been violated and that a complaint should issue, NLRA, Section 10(l), a standard that has
been interpreted as meaning not that the it is likely that the NLRA has been violated but that the factual allegations
and propositions of law underlying the Regional Director's petition are not “insubstantial and frivolous.” San
Francisco–Oakland Newspaper Guild v. Kennedy, 412 F.2d 541, 544 (9th Cir.1969). Thus, courts rarely scrutinize
Regional Directors’ conclusions that the NLRB has reasonable cause to believe the NLRA has been violated in 10(l)
petitions. But see Overstreet v. Carpenters Local 1506, 409 F.3d 1199 (9 th Cir. 2005) (denying regional director’s
10(l) petition because “reasonable cause” test applied to agency but not court). There is some uncertainty about
whether the standard for finding a Section 8(b)(4) violation—thereby triggering a mandatory statutory duty to seek
10(l) injunctive relief—differs from ordinary principles of “prosecutorial” discretion. In Saint Elizabeth’s Hospital
v. N.L.R.B. 2010 WL 796824 (N.D.Ohio), for example, an employer petitioned for a writ of mandamus premised on
an oral opinion communicated by the Regional office that a Section 8(b)(4) charge had “arguable merit.” Id. slip op.
at 1. The Regional Director nevertheless declined to issue a complaint because the subject of the administrative
charge—whether the displaying of an inflatable rat was unlawful signal picketing under Section 8(b)(4)—was
already under review in the General Counsel’s office in several other cases. Id. The employer took the position that
because the Region had informally opined that the charge had “arguable merit” it was not “insubstantial and
frivolous” and the Region was therefore required to seek a 10(l) injunction, and filed a writ of mandamus to compel
the Region to do so. Id. Ultimately the court denied the employer’s writ, Id. slip op, at 12, but the facts were
strongly in the Region’s favor. It is notable that the court failed to cite a single case in which the NLRB’s refusal to
find a Section 8(b)(4) violation and pursue a 10(l) injunction had been upheld by a reviewing court on generic
“prosecutorial discretion” grounds. Perhaps the issue is too obvious to spur substantial litigation, but the question for
ALT-Labor is whether a region refusing to find an 8(b)(4) violation on a “no labor organization” theory would be
vulnerable to attack.
139 See infra. at II.B.2.b
140 337 NLRB 1286 (2003)

employees, and consisting of approximately fifty employees, was a labor organization though it
had unsigned by-laws, had never taken minutes, had not been recognized by any employer or
certified by the NLRB, had not negotiated any contracts, had not received dues from employees,
had no income, assets or paid staff, and was operating out of one employee’s house. 141 One
employee testified that, “the Petitioner was created to ‘organize, negotiate contracts regarding
wages, working conditions, hours of employment … [and] grievance procedures.’”142 That was
enough for the Regional Director to conclude that the organization in question was a labor
organization within the meaning of the NLRA, 143 and the NLRB in short order affirmed the
determination.144 In support of the decision the Regional Director cited a number of cases in
which the NLRB found that groups were statutory labor organizations in circumstances where
there was no evidence of pattern or practice or of the existence of a bilateral mechanism. 145 Each
of the cases involved very early organizational efforts and were either representation cases or
involved unfair labor practices in nascent organizing drives. 146 This makes a great deal of sense.
At the inception of an organizing drive there can be no bilateral mechanism or pattern of
bargaining with an employer, and in the case of unaffiliated labor organizations, of the kind
apparently at issue in Coinmach, there is unlikely to be a practice of dealing with any employer.
The decisions of the NLRB suggest that it is much more willing to look exclusively at express
purpose and ignore “pattern and practice” in representational or early organizational cases. The
problem is that the decisions seem to establish a principle that the barest expression of a purpose
to represent employees is sufficient as a matter of law to establish labor organization status. It is
difficult to reconcile Coinmach with ROC-NY. The “dealing with purpose” evidence in the latter
was much greater than the evidence in the former. Such sharp inconsistency may not go
unnoticed by courts in secondary boycott contexts, especially in Section 303 actions. Courts may
prefer the representational cases so as to find ALT-Labor groups Section 2(5) labor organizations
by virtue of the groups’ express statements of purpose.
2. Dealing With Purpose Inferred from Protest

Perhaps this much is clear: ALT-Labor protest with no bargaining or “bilateral mechanism”
involved should not be adequate in itself to render an ALT-Labor group a “labor organization.”
The difficulty is that protest may create discussion leading to consideration of how much
dialogue would be required to establish a bilateral mechanism or a pattern and practice of
interaction and consideration of proposals. Assuming, however, an ALT-Labor group is solely
protesting employer practices its “message” appears more like a unilateral demand and less like
141 Id. at 1287
142 Id. at 1288, n.2
143 Id. at 1287
144 Id. at 1286
145 Coinmach, 337 NLRB at 1286 citing Butler Mfg. Co., 167 NLRB 308 (1967); East Dayton Tool & Die Co., 194
NLRB 266 (1971); Comet Rice Mills, 195 NLRB 671, 674 (1972); Yale New Haven Hospital, 309 NLRB 363
(1992); Betances Health Unit, 283 NLRB 369, 375 (1987)
146 Id.

any form of bilateral discussion or invitation to engage in bargaining. In the posture of protest
the group’s demand is as much a message to the general public about the targeted employer’s
practices as it is a communication to the employer with whom it has a dispute. Courts have
previously utilized avoidance canons when interpreting portions of the NLRA that might have
rendered predominantly expressive activity unlawful under the statute,147 messages directed to
consumers rather than to employees, for example, and indeed there are a number of “publicity
provisos” built into the statute that operate in practice as a kind of constitutional safety valve. 148
Interpreting the labor organization definition in such a way as to broadly convert social advocacy
groups into labor organizations subject to NLRA injunction carries obvious chilling potential.
Courts may therefore be inclined to interpret the definition of labor organization narrowly when
it is clear there is no colorable union activity at issue.
a. Center for United Labor Action

This avoidance rationale may respond to an objection that David Rosenfeld has raised that
something akin to protest may in fact be deemed a form of “dealing with.” Mr. Rosenfeld
recounts the case of Center for United Labor Action149 (“CULA”) in which CULA, arguably an
NLRA labor organization, was found by the NLRB not to be such an organization. The question
was of threshold importance because the charging party, Sibley, a retail clothing store in
Rochester, New York, alleged that CULA was engaged in a secondary boycott against it. The
primary employer, it was alleged, was Farah Manufacturing, a maker of clothes, which was
involved in a nationwide labor dispute with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (the
ACA). The charge had been filed against both the CULA and the ACA. The ACA, an admitted
NLRA labor organization, quickly and predictably settled the case, after the NLRB found
administratively that it had engaged in an unlawful secondary boycott. CULA, which had
become involved in the labor dispute once it became clear that the ACA was meeting with little
success, declined to settle, and the secondary boycott case went to trial. The question presented
was whether CULA was a “labor organization” so as to bring it within the ambit of the NLRA’s
secondary boycott provisions. The NLRB found that it was not. Mr. Rosenfeld, echoing the
dissenting Board member, finds the majority opinion problematic. Yet it is explainable by
reference to Constitutional avoidance principles if it is accepted that there was a substantial
argument that a putative labor organization was engaging in predominantly expressive activity.
What did CULA do? Well, to begin with, unlike much of ALT-Labor, it defined itself as a
defender of unions and as an aggressive supporter of the union cause. 150 It supported union
strikes. It engaged in picketing of other retailers carrying Farah’s products, in other words it
participated directly in the union campaign, and across state lines. 151 It even assisted striking
147 DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (interpreting Section 8(b)(4) of the
NLRA not to prohibit peaceful but arguably secondary leafleting to avoid the serious First Amendment problems
that would be created by a finding of prohibition).
148 See Section 8(b)(4)(B) and Section 8(b)(7)
149 219 NLRB 879 (1975)
150 Id. at 877
151 Id.

employees of other unionized employers involved in wholly separate labor disputes. 152 In sum, it
was engaged in a broad variety of activities in those disputes. 153 Some examples included
representation of discharged workers before the state unemployment commission in opposition to
an employer’s position;154 and helping and assisting employees at a plant who wanted to
unionize.155 However, what it primarily did in the actual case under consideration with respect
to Sibley was to picket,156 albeit in a manner, if it was a labor organization, that would almost
certainly violate Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. In connection with the labor organization
question, it was quite evident that employees participated in CULA.157 It was equally evident,
however, that despite all of the labor organization-like activity in the record CULA had never
attempted to negotiate or communicate with Sibley.158 It has solely engaged in protest activity.
The question for the ALJ hearing the case was whether by engaging in concerted activities or
assisting and persuading employees to do so CULA was “dealing with” Sibley.159 The ALJ,
despite finding that CULA’s activity did render it an NLRA labor organization,160 nevertheless
refused to find a violation because “such a result tends to warp the structure and distort the
policy and purposes of the Act.”161 Sibley objected that such a conclusion would tend to
encourage “outside organizations” to engage in secondary boycotts, 162 an argument essentially
anticipating this discussion.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the NLRB on appeal did not adopt the reasoning of the ALJ insofar
as he found CULA to be a labor organization, although it did uphold his finding of “no
violation.”163 The NLRB concluded that the ALJ erroneously equated support for a “social

152 Id.
153 Center for United Labor Action, supra. at 877
154 Id. at 878
155 Id.
156 Id. at 878
157 Center for United Labor Action, supra. at 878
158 Id.
159 Id. at 879
160 Id. On this point I read the case differently than Mr. Rosenfeld, who concluded that the ALJ did not find labor
organization status. Rosenfeld, Worker Centers at 487.
161 Center for United Labor Action, supra. at 879. The ALJ cited the familiar rule of statutory construction that “a
thing may be within the letter of a statute and yet not within a statute . . .” Id.
162 Id. at 880
163 Id. at 873

cause” with the desire to represent individuals in pursuit of such a cause.164 In rejecting the ALJ’s
reasoning the NLRB said,
Many present day labor disputes are viewed by some as problems which extend
beyond the confines of the plant involved and have an impact on the community
at large or, in some instances, on the Nation itself. In such circumstances, it is not
unusual for social activist groups, newspapers, and clergy to actively support the
employees' cause and to seek to marshal public opinion in support of it. It would
also be uncommon if, among those who belong to such organizations, there were
not some individuals who would meet the definition of employees under our Act.
But are we then to conclude that any organization which engages in strikesupporting activities exists, at least in part, for the purpose of dealing with
employers over employee labor relations matters? We believe that such a
conclusion would be ridiculous on its face. Support for a cause, no matter how
active it may become, does not rise to the level of representation unless it can be
demonstrated that the organization in question is expressly or implicitly seeking
to deal with the employer over matters affecting the employees.165
It may well be true, as Mr. Rosenfeld has argued, that the NLRB majority was applying extrastatutory criteria, or even an incorrect standard altogether, when it additionally opined that “to
qualify as a labor organization under our Act the organization must be selected and designated by
employees for the purpose of resolving their conflicts with employers.” 166 The labor organization
doctrine as it appears to exist today would clearly not support the NLRB’s proposition. 167 The
gist of the opinion, however, seems to be that to define a labor organization as the ALJ did would
be to embroil the Act in interpretive difficulties. It should be remembered that at that time the
Board did not yet have the benefit of labor-specific avoidance canon cases like DeBartolo and
Catholic Bishop of Chicago,168 which emphasized in the context of the NLRA that “where an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly

164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Rosenfeld, Worker Centers at 487 citing Center for United Labor Action at 873
167 The NLRB’s statement seems to refer to Section 9(a) of the NLRA:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of
the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all
the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. (Emphases mine).
The NLRB appeared, in effect, to be saying that only certified representatives could be labor organizations, which
seems obviously wrong.
168 DeBartolo supra. at 575; NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 499-501, 504 (1979)

contrary to the intent of Congress.”169 To hold that an activist group is an NLRA labor
organization merely because it protests repeatedly and employees participate in it, so as to
expose the group to civil liability for peaceful expressive activity, appears to activate this
principle.170
It is worth noting that some contemporaneous commentary on Center for United Labor
Action imagined that the case did stand for the proposition that almost any group admitting
employees to its membership, including broader civil society protest groups, might add up to a
labor organization:
In light of the consistently liberal interpretations-of "organization," it appears that
a group, even less structured than CULA would come within the ambit of this
term under section 2(5) . . . for instance, a group of workers who suddenly
decided to visit the president's office and demand higher wages was held to be a
labor organization. The implication of [CULA] is that any protest group, no
matter how loosely formed, will-be deemed an organization under the Act.
Illustrative of such groups are two individuals who, upon seeing one another in
front of a store, agree to take shifts and picket, or interested citizens who decide
spontaneously to join and sells products through the store, or finally, several
dissenting CULA members who agree to picket, contrary to their group's decision.
Such ad hoc protest groups are less structured than CULA in that they are not
"highly purposed with a continuous existence." Yet under the standards of [the
liberal NLRB cases] they surely would be deemed [labor] organizations. Indeed,
under [one especially liberal] interpretation of section 2(5), perhaps only a single
picket would be outside the ambit of the "organization" element.171
Even outside the confines of Center for United Labor Action some scholars appeared at that
point in time to assume that all kinds of groups might be labor organizations. For example,
Professor Meltzer argued in connection with the celebrated case Emporium Capwell172 that the
169 DeBartolo supra. at 575
170 It is worth noting, even if in passing, that the Supreme Court’s treatment of speech issues in the context of
secondary picketing in which a labor organization was clearly involved was in my judgment far from compelling.
Although a full analysis of the foundational case in this area, Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694 (1951), is
beyond the scope of this discussion, it is very clear that the Court did not apply anything approaching “strict
scrutiny” to Section 8(b)(4), nor did it hew closely to avoidance canon principles. To expand the doctrine to groups
whose labor organization status is unclear may have the effect of reopening decades-old discussions on picketing
and speech issues glossed over in the union context. As Charlotte Garden has argued, “the Court has yet to place
union speech on the same footing as the speech of other social movements or to present a coherent theory of the
First Amendment as it applies to labor speech.” Charlotte Garden, Labor Values Are First Amendment Values: Why
Union Comprehensive
Campaigns Are Protected Speech, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617, 2647 (2011). ALT-Labor may represent a kind of
conflation of movements creating confusion in the courts and accordingly promoting unpredictability in litigation.
171 Comment, Protest Groups and Labor Disputes - Toward a Definition of Labor Organization: Center for United
Labor Action, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 795, 801-802 (1976)
172 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975)

dissident group of minority employees in opposition to the incumbent union in that case 173 were
themselves probably a labor organization. Such a contention sounds odd to my 21 st century ears.
It would seem to follow that the minority dissident group, in addition to being denied the
protection of Section 7 of the NLRA may additionally have been capable of violating Section
8(b).174
The CULA Board could only respond that the proposition was “ridiculous on its face” but
when it attempted to say why it apparently found it necessary to evade the actual language of
Section 2(5) in order to arrive at what I think was the right outcome.175
b. Waugh Chapel South

Perhaps such an avoidance policy was also operating sub silentio in the Fourth Circuit’s
recent opinion in Waugh Chapel South.176 In that case, a commercial real estate developer of a
shopping center in Anne Arundel County, Maryland planned to lease a storefront unit to
Wegmans Food Markets (the supermarket).177 The United Food and Commercial Workers Union
(the union) and the Mid-Atlantic Retail Food Industry Joint Labor Management Fund (the fund)
opposed the project because the supermarket was not unionized.178 A union official allegedly
threatened to oppose any future projects of the developer in which the supermarket would be a
tenant.179 Because the union’s dispute was with the supermarket the developer was a neutral to
173 The employees engaged in protest activities in a manner that was at odds with the incumbent union in the
workplace. The employees were fired and the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that they were deprived of the
protection of the NLRA for acting in derogation of their exclusive bargaining representative. Id. at 52-56, 70
174 Professor Meltzer was at the time criticizing the circuit court’s decision to reverse the NLRB’s decision denying
protection to the dissidents. Western Addition Community Organization v. N. L. R. B., 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir.
1973) rev’d on other grounds 420 U.S. 50 (1975). Professor Meltzer’s point was that the court appeared to be
conferring the protection of the NLRA under Section 8(a) even as it was, as he saw it, undermining Section 8(b). His
confidence that the dissident employees comprised a 2(5) labor organization is striking.
175 At roughly the same time the NLRB was deciding CULA its prosecutorial arm, the General Counsel’s Office,
was occasionally deciding in Advice Memoranda that loosely structured picketing and protesting groups were
Section 2(5) labor organizations. Marculewicz and Thomas, Labor Organizations by Another Name at 83; see
Acme/Alltrans Strike Committee, Case No. 21-CB-6318, Division of Advice Memorandum (April 25, 1978) (a
group of former employees picketing for a job); Protesting Citizens and its Agent Elvin Winn, Case 15-CC-681,
Advice Memorandum (August 30, 1977) (group of unemployed workers picketing for a job and union scales); but
see Michael E. Drobney, an Agent of Laborers Local 498 (T.E. Ibberson), Cases 8-CC-835, 8-CB-3229 Advice
Memorandum (December 30, 1976) (group of job applicants picketing for a job not labor organization because no
evidence of desire for employer to deal with them as a group, but simply hire them). It does not appear that the
cases found meritorious proceeded to litigation. Given the unstructured and apparently unsophisticated nature of the
ad hoc groups involved the cases probably settled quickly. None of the “labor organizations” involved looked
remotely like a hybrid social advocacy group.
176 728 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2013)
177 Id. at 356
178 Id. at 357
179 Id.

the labor dispute. The union and the fund were subsequently involved in the filing of fourteen
legal challenges to the development.180 Each of the challenges was dismissed, withdrawn, or
mooted by subsequent developments.181 The developer thereafter sued the union and the fund in
federal district court under Section 303 of the NLRA, arguing that the legal challenges filed
against it as a neutral were a sham and thus a form of secondary boycott. 182 The court held that
while sham litigation could violate the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA,183 and a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the union had engaged in such conduct,184 the
fund was not a “labor organization” subject to the NLRA.185 The court noted that in order to fall
under the NLRA’s definition of labor organization an entity must meet the “dealing with
employers” requirement, and that neither the purpose nor the activity of the fund involved
“dealing with” employers.186 In coming to this conclusion the court cited circuit precedent
holding that no labor organization status may be applied in the absence of a bilateral mechanism
through which “there is a ‘pattern or practice’ over time of employee proposals concerning
working conditions, coupled with management consideration thereof . . .” 187 The court, in other
words, applied the NLRB’s interpretive formulation from cases like DuPont and Electromation
and placed significant emphasis on the fact that the fund’s charter explicitly prohibited it from
“participating directly or indirectly ... in union collective activities.”188 The conclusion is
puzzling because the fund was involved in the alleged sham litigation with the union and
therefore participating directly in union activities in violation of its charter— the same litigation
that the court was in the same breath saying rendered the union potentially liable to a secondary
boycott violation. One could certainly argue that the fund’s actions in violation of its charter
made its subsequent characterization of its organizational purposes suspect. It could also be
argued that a series of legal actions between the contractor and the fund (an organization in
which employees participated) amounted to a bilateral mechanism in which proposals between
employer and group were exchanged—for example, settlement proposals and demand.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that
[T]he only fact suggesting any interactions between the Fund and an employer
concerns the alleged secondary boycott. There is plainly no “bilateral mechanism”
180 Waugh Chapel South supra. at 357-358
181 Id. at 358
182 Id.
183 Id. at 367
184 Waugh Chapel South, supra. at 367
185 Id. at 362
186 Id. at 361-62.
187 Id. at 361 citing N.L.R.B. v. Peninsula General Hospital Medical Center, 36 F.3d 1262, 1270 (4th Cir. 1994)
188 Waugh Chapel South supra. at 361

when the only alleged contact between an employee entity and management is an
unfair labor practice directed against an employer.
The “fact,” however, consisted of a series of legal and administrative challenges spanning the
period from August 2008 to July 2011.189
It seems reasonable to speculate whether the court was anxiously dismissive of the argument
that the fund was a labor organization because it had before it a difficult question involving
whether alleged sham litigation could violate the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA. On
the merits of the case the court was unsure about the appropriate “sham legal action” standard to
apply when multiple instances rather than a single incident of sham legal actions had been
alleged.190 In the context of a difficult First Amendment issue involving court access one
suspects the court preferred a “clean” jurisdictional posture, and the labor organization issue, had
it continued to be pressed by the fund, was not clean. By dismissing the fund, the jurisdictional
issue—and potentially an additional constitutional issue—was avoided.
C. The Crux of the Statutory Interpretation Problem

Whether ALT-Labor groups are NLRA labor organizations therefore appears in practice to be
a function of at least three factors: (i) how a particular group explicitly defines its purpose; (ii) a
fact-finder’s inference drawn from the group’s actions; and (iii) whether the group’s actions
implicate constitutionally protected conduct.191 Member Devaney expressed the problem
succinctly in the NLRB’s Electromation decision, “I note that Cabot Carbon's rejection of the
notion that “dealing with” is synonymous with collective bargaining failed to delineate the lower
limits of the conduct: if ‘dealing with’ is less than bargaining, what is it more than?” 192 The
question has not yet been answered in a satisfactory manner. The risk for ALT-Labor today is
that the lower limits are in flux and could “descend” to the conduct in which it is customarily
engaged.
The crux of the statutory interpretation problem in Section 2(5) may not have been clearly
enough identified by decision makers. At the heart of the confusion may be a failure to
distinguish what might be called “internal” from “external” labor organization applications. The
broad labor organization definition was crafted with an eye to internal workplace applications. It
was intended to outlaw the internal “company union.” The idea was to define labor organization
broadly and then, through operation of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, to prevent an employer
from controlling the organization. The resulting statutory formulation makes it an unfair labor
189 Waugh Chapel South supra. at 357-58
190 Id. at 363 (“We have not had occasion to confront this issue, as our precedent has applied [sham litigation
doctrine] only where a party has alleged a single sham proceeding.”)
191 Mr. Naduris-Weissman more formally describes the general interpretive approaches at play in this area as
“textualism” and “intentionalism.” Naduris-Weissman, Worker Center Movement at 273-276. I agree almost
completely with his formal discussion of interpretive methods. My classification is meant to describe in context and
somewhat informally what courts and the NLRB appear generally to be doing with respect to the labor organization
definition. Regardless the classification scheme, the lesson to be drawn is that cases as a practical matter may be
decided different ways in different contexts. That is the problem ALT-Labor faces.
192 Electromation, 309 NLRB 990, 1002 (1992)

practice for an employer “to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it.” 193 The question of who can
violate the secondary boycott provisions, on the other hand, is a labor organization external
application of Taft-Hartley, a version of the NLRA that was obviously not in existence when the
labor organization definition was initially conceived. The external application arises not in the
context of the putative labor organization’s internal interaction with employees of a particular
employer but rather in the context of the organization externally interacting with other
employers. Cabot Carbon, and the NLRB’s subsequent interpretation of the case in internal
application contexts does not speak to that situation. To have any chance of placing the situation
in proper statutory context the preferable approach is to consult Taft-Hartley’s legislative history.
In lieu of an exhaustive examination of the legislative history of the Taft-Harley Act or the
LMRDA respecting the labor organization definition,194 it better suits my purposes to explore
roughly contemporaneous court decisions in secondary boycott, “external application” contexts.
In DiGiorgio Fruit v. N.L.R.B.,195 a case decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals a few years
after enactment of Taft-Hartley, the court upheld the NLRB’s determination that a farm workers’
union could not be held liable under the NLRA’s secondary boycott provisions because it was
comprised exclusively of agricultural workers not covered under the NLRA; accordingly, no
“employees” participated in the group and by definition the union did not qualify as an NLRA
labor organization.196 In the course of the court’s discussion there was no consideration of the
different “external” circumstances to which the labor organization definition was being
applied.197 Soon after the enactment of the LMRDA in 1959, which among other things, amended
and tightened the secondary boycott provisions, in the case of International Organization of
Masters, M & P v. N.L.R.B.,198 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struggled with whether Masters,
M & P, the involved putative labor organization engaged in alleged secondary boycotting, was a
statutory labor organization.199 The NLRB concluded that it was, and applied the secondary
boycott provisions to the group, finding a violation.200 Masters, M & P argued that it could not be
held responsible for an unfair labor practice as a labor organization because the pilots for whose
193 NLRA Section 8(a)(2)
194 There was apparently primarily a great deal of discussion about how labor organizations should be restrained
and little discussion about what they in fact were. See Marculewicz and Thomas, Labor Organizations by Another
Name at 80-82. The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley that there were some early committee drafts that would
have permitted an employer to lawfully form an employee committee provided that the employer would only
“discuss” workplace issues with it. The proposal was defeated because it was assumed it was merely an attempt to
legalize company unions. LeRoy, Employee Participation at 1704-1705.
195 191 F.2d 642 (1951)
196 Id. 644-648
197 The definition is set forth without discussion of its legislative origins in the Wagner Act. Id. at 644.
198 351 F.2d 771 (1965)
199 Id. at 774-778
200 Id. at 773

benefit the secondary boycott had been effected were not themselves employees under the
NLRA.201 However, unlike the situation in DiGiorgio Fruit some of the group’s members were
statutory employees,202 thereby satisfying the 2(5) statutory requirement that employees must
participate for a group to be found a labor organization. After eventually concluding that
Masters, M & P was a 2(5) labor organization, the court said,
We observe that this characterization of MMP as a ‘labor organization’ means
simply that that entity, as presently constituted, is such an organization for all
purposes under the Act. In other words, the use of the term ‘labor organization’ in
any section of the Act must apply to MMP unless some further language of the
section or its legislative history indicates a contrary result.203 (Emphasis supplied)
Cases like DiGiorgio Fruit and Masters, M & P204 strongly suggest that courts deciding cases
at around the time of the enactment of the secondary boycott provisions did not view the scope
of the labor organization definition as being narrowed in application to secondary boycotts. That
is not good news for ALT-Labor, for it suggests that courts may find no interpretive reason
arising from the statute to narrow the labor standard labor organization definition in “external”
secondary boycott contexts.205
Stefan Marculewicz and Jennifer Thomas identified one explanation for courts’
unwillingness to interpretively narrow the scope of the labor organization definition. 206 As they
point out, the LMRDA, a substantial amendment of the NLRA directed at, among other things,
the corrupt internal practices of unions, arguably broadened the labor organization definition.207
Although some commentators have argued that the definition was narrowed rather than
broadened,208 it seems unlikely that in the course of tinkering with the labor organization
201 Id. at 774
202 Masters, M & P, supra, at 774
203 Id. at 777
204 I will merely also mention in passing that another contemporaneous case in which labor organization status was
found with no suggestion that Taft-Hartley had modified the labor organization definition was Judge Friendly’s
opinion in Nat'l Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 167 (2 Cir. 1960)
205 There are of course many approaches that the court might use in marching through their exegetical mission.
Those methods in the context of the labor organization question have been exhaustively canvassed by Eli NadurisWeissman.
206 Marculewicz and Thomas, Labor Organizations by Another Name at 85
207 Id. Because part of the purpose of the amended statute was to eliminate union corruption it would make little
sense to permit unions with opportunities to wiggle out of the labor organization definition. However, broadening
respecting internal applications—and I view the anticorruption measures of the LMRDA as directed at the internal
relations between worker and union in a particular workplace or bargaining unit—does not ultimately speak to the
question of the appropriate scope of the labor organization definition in external applications.
208 Naduris-Weissman, Worker Center Movement at 289

definition in one part of the amended statute the secondary boycott provisions would have been
left unmodified if narrowing had been legislatively contemplated.
Thus, whatever the theoretical validity to the contention that the internal origins of the labor
organization definition is not easily exportable to external circumstances courts have not said as
much and, on the contrary, seem oriented to a universal statutory definition. This conclusion
appears especially troublesome for ALT-Labor in the context of Section 303 actions. While the
NLRB may continue at the administrative level to decline pursuit of Section 8(b)(4) violations
involving ALT-Labor on the “pattern and practice” theory, what the federal courts will do with
the labor organization definition in the context of secondary boycott cases is anyone’s guess.
While the courts have been quite clear that under Section 303 individuals may not be sued,209
there has been no distinction of which I am aware made between unions and other kinds of labor
organizations. Indeed, I am not aware of cases discussing Cabot Carbon or the NLRB’s pattern
or practice theory in the context of a Section 303 action.
If I were representing an ALT-Labor group contemplating an arguable secondary boycott I
would feel compelled to acknowledge my inability to predict with confidence whether my client
would be deemed a labor organization by the NLRB or by a federal district court. My best
counsel would probably be that the NLRB would probably not issue an administrative complaint
or seek a 10(l) injunction in connection with an ALT-Labor secondary boycott. To make more
likely that outcome I would warn against setting up durable bilateral mechanisms for interacting
with employers, establishing any sustained negotiations with specific employers, or even
focusing on individual companies in broader campaigns. 210 None of that would overcome an
explicit statement in the group’s charter or mission statements that it in fact existed for the
purpose of dealing with employers over statutory subjects. However, Cabot Carbon with its
undefined lower limits of conduct for establishment of labor organization status stands like a
shadowy sentry continually calling into question whether that advice would carry the day. Its
lower boundaries could reach all the way to a Section 303 action.
III.

TOWARD A “LABOR ORGANIZATION” BARGAIN

ALT-Labor—indeed all of labor—should understand the considerable risk to nascent labor
groups embedded in traditional labor law. Both unions and non-traditional labor advocates have
been eager to avoid traditional labor law because of its well-known deficiencies in adequately
protecting the exercise of concerted employee rights, especially during traditional
representational election campaigns.211 The question for the labor movement now is not whether
it should avoid labor law because of its notoriously inadequate protective shield, but whether the
209 See e.g. Schultz v. N.L.R.B., 284 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
210 This is apparently the advice of labor lawyer Eli Naduris-Weissman, a leading commentator in this area of the
law who has in fact counseled worker centers on some of these issues. Eli Naduris-Weissman, Worker Center
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Guide
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Traditional
Labor
Law
available
at
http://nlg-laboremploycomm.org/media/ProjWkrCtr_2010_Naduris-W_WkrCtrStratGuideLbrLaw.pdf (Jan. 2010) (last accessed January
31, 2014); see also Thomas Brom, Solidarity for Later, CALIFORNIA LAWYER available at
http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?eid=932277&wteid=932277_Solidarity_for_Later
211 James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90
IOWA L. REV. 819, 828-830 (2005) (explaining that unions began to avoid the NLRB altogether in the mid-1990s)

labor movement can avoid labor law as a sword. 212 The simple truth is that traditional labor law
imposes significant restraints on labor organizations, including the secondary boycott
prohibitions that have been under discussion here,213 and a number of ALT-Labor groups almost
certainly fall within the labor organization definition.214
Yet there is an opportunity presented for both labor and business. Devised in the 1930s as an
important part of the original NLRA, the broad labor organization definition was originally
meant to ward off the early 1930s employer tactic of creating puppet, in house unions to distract
employee interest in authentic unions.215 The statutory strategy was to define labor organizations
(as we have seen) very broadly and then to strictly prohibit employer involvement in them. 216
The present iteration of ALT-Labor may be merely the tip of the proverbial iceberg with respect
to folks who have simply had enough organizing themselves into non-traditional or even
unrecognizable kinds of groupings. In all sorts of workplaces non-union employees routinely
initiate concerted protest online, and the NLRB has in several cases acted to protect such
activity.217 Imagine a group of cyber protesters, angry at their company, who electronically
attempt to persuade other workers employed by other companies—say customers of their
company—not to go to work to pressure their company to agree to their demands. 218 The cyber
group could be found a labor organization; it may have violated secondary boycott prohibitions.
Even more broadly, one can conceive current low wage workers as simply the front edge of a
rapidly expanding precariat. As Katherine Stone has recently written, “More and more, workers
are hired on temporary or fixed term contracts, without any hope of regular employment. The
new ‘precariat’ move in and out of the labor market, earning low wages when they have work,
and putting strains on public welfare and health care systems when they do not.” 219 Policy
212 Rosenfeld, Worker Centers at 471 (“As they grow in number and scope, worker centers will have their
development and effectiveness arrested by the very problem they were designed to avoid: the regulation of and
restrictions on labor organizations under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).”)
213 See supra. Section I
214 See supra. Section II
215 LeRoy, Employee Participation at 1654-55
216 Section 8(a)(2) states in relevant part that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer “to dominate or interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it.”
217 See Steven Greenhouse, Even if it Enrages Your Boss, Social Net Speech is Protected, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21,
2013) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/technology/employers-social-media-policies-come-underregulatory-scrutiny.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
218 Professors Martin Malin and Henry Perritt hint at this emerging problem when they note, in a discussion of the
NLRB’s early stage deliberations over the “electronic workplace,” that among the questions that will have to be
considered are the types of economic pressure that may lawfully be brought to bear on all-electronic workplaces.
Martin H. Malin and Henry H Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace: Union Organizing in
Electronic Workplaces 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000). One might add that both the questions of primary and
secondary pressure will have to be considered. It is extremely easy to imagine unintentional formation of an
electronic, cyber “labor organization” unwittingly “dealing with” an employer and then applying secondary pressure
to it.
219Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Green Shoots in the Labor Market: A Cornucopia of Social Experiments, UCLA
School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 14-01 at 10 (Jan. 22, 2014) available at

makers’ usual reaction to developments such as these is to argue that the regulatory state should
become more “flexible” to accommodate the “new” economic reality.220 However, there is
nothing new about this reality. It was the reality of the 19 th century, a reality that forward
thinking policy makers and an energetic, organized working class was able to alter. The question
is whether unions wish to accept a world of flexibility or create a world of stability, as did their
forbears, by assisting pockets of resistance even if it means risking changes in a statutory regime
that has become more talismanic than real.
Unions can diminish concern respecting modification of the labor organization definition by
thinking “horizontally.” The concerns associated with dominated “committees”—internal
employee committees arguably “dealing with” employers respecting conditions of employment
— arose during a time when there was some prospect of an intra-workplace struggle, a “vertical”
contest over control of continuing employment. Now, however, unions will be more likely to
turn to the business of what might be called “serial organizing.” Serial organizing recognizes
that workers will increasingly be moving quickly, from insecure job to insecure job. It makes
little sense for a union to expend resources to organize workers in ephemeral workplaces.
Rather, organization will most efficiently be undertaken between workplaces, guiding, educating,
and “connecting up” workers as they themselves engage in quick sharp conflicts with their
precariat employers.
A recent labor dispute illustrates the idea. On January 28, 2014, a worker at a Whole Foods
grocery in Chicago missed work when she had to stay home with her special needs child when
school was cancelled as a result of a snow storm. 221 The woman and her co-workers, none of
whom were represented by a union, believed that they had previously negotiated an attendance
policy agreement with their employer that would have excused the woman under its terms. 222
The woman was fired, however, and her co-workers walked off the job in protest. 223 One of the
employees interviewed in connection with the job action said,
We’re not “union workers” in the sense that we don’t have a contract – we
certainly would like to have one eventually . . . But the reality is that the union is
you deciding with your co-workers to actually join together and exert collective
power against the boss. That’s what the essence of a union is.224
After the walkout Chicago Teachers Union President Karen Lewis headlined a supportive rally
that was organized by the Workers Organizing Committee of Chicago, the Chicago chapter of
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383575; GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS
CLASS (Bloomsbury Academic, 2011) (hereinafter Stone, Green Shoots)
220 See e.g. Id. at 7-10
221 Josh Eidelson, That’s cold, Whole Foods: Polar vortex firing spurs Chicago strike, SALON (Feb. 5, 2014)
available at http://www.salon.com/2014/02/05/thats_cold_whole_foods_polar_vortex_firing_spurs_chicago_strike/
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.

Fast Forward.225
This situation illustrates that workers are capable of independent, smaller scale organizing at
their own discreet workplaces and of conceptualizing in broad terms collective power. At the
same time, unions are capable of “connecting up” with those workers afterwards. However, it
also illustrates some of the coordination risks under discussion in this article. The magazine
article from which the story is recounted does not mention the location of the rally, the message
of the rally participants, or to whom, precisely, the message was directed. As already explained,
these inquiries would be critical in assessing whether a secondary boycott could be alleged by an
employer.
Some have argued in essence that sections 2(5) and/or 8(a)(2) should simply be eliminated
because, as the argument has been expressed, the interplay of the provisions leaves employees, as
a practical matter, with a choice between unionized participation in workplace governance and
no participation at all.226 Professor Clyde Summers has argued, however, that if Section 8(a)(2)
were eliminated it would set the stage for massive employer anti-union campaigns and
establishment of sham unions that employees would be poorly equipped to identify. 227 A similar
outcome might be produced, of course, if Section 2(5)’s labor organization definition were
narrowed in some manner to cover “a certified union” or a “union representing employees,” or
something of the sort. A narrower definition might mean that employers could establish and
dominate non-labor organizations not fitting into the narrower definition, thereby deceiving
employees into thinking they have independent representation when they do not. To contend
with this problem Samuel Estreicher has proposed a modified Section 8(a)(2) that would ban
employers from installing organizations “that purport to function as the independent collective
agency of the workers,” but would in all other respects permit business-related employee
participation schemes.228 Such a modification might simultaneously narrow the applicability of
Section 2(5), possibly having the practical effect of rescuing ALT-Labor from secondary boycott
liability. However, when considering such modifications there is no escaping the continuing risk
of employee deception engendered by relaxation of the Section 2(5) labor organization definition
if Section 8(a)(2) is simultaneously weakened.
Labor-sympathetic commentators have also argued for the elimination of Section 8(b)(4)
altogether. Professor Julius Getman has contended, for example that,
Section 8(b)(4) places massive and unique limitations upon the ability of unions
to use economic pressure to support each other's strikes. No one doubts that its
repeal would be a great victory for unions and that legislative achievement of this
goal has been long sought and almost impossible to achieve.229
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That may be true, but such a thing seemed practically impossible when he wrote the words a
decade ago and virtually unthinkable in the present ossified reality. Similarly, employers have
had intense interest for over a decade in modifying or abolishing Section 8(a)(2) or Section 2(5)
of the NLRA, or both, and this interest culminated in the passage of the TEAM Act in 1995, 230 a
bill that was ultimately vetoed by Bill Clinton.231 While the TEAM Act, or something like it, has
had its supporters over the years, it is just as obvious that it cannot pass in the current political
environment as secondary boycotts would not be eliminated. It would be hard to argue that the
present environment is not more polarized than it was during the Clinton Administration. The
surprisingly underdeveloped and unpredictable law surrounding the labor organization definition
explored in this article, and in the work of lead commentators like Eli Naduris-Weismann, leads
to the conclusion that some present and future ALT-Labor groups may be found labor
organizations and some may not. One senses, however, that the likelihood of litigation over the
labor organization question is not so unpredictable. As things stand now it is easy to imagine
secondary boycott cases being decided one way at the NLRB and in an entirely different manner
in the federal courts, for example in the course of Section 303 actions. That kind of uncertainty
does not seem especially desirable for anyone.
Those outside of business circles opposed to unions on policy grounds might also support a
re-worked labor organization definition—for reasons other than the reflexive rationale that it
could increase opportunities for employers to establish participatory committees. A libertarian
argument in support of ALT-Labor has been under discussion recently: ALT-Labor, whatever it is,
represents a labor relations model outside the “compulsory unionism” that conservatives and
libertarians tend to deride. If we conceive of union unfair labor practices as the Taft-Hartley
policy counterweight to exclusive representation and employee funded unions—to union power
— ALT-Labor is outside that paradigm. It does not enjoy governmental, exclusive representation
protection.232 In the NLRA regime (as in any functioning political democracy) the majority rules,
achieves governmental status, and that is in theory the end of the matter.233 Any non-majority,
230 H.R.743, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 295, 104th Cong. (1995). Section 3 of the Bill would have amended Section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA as follows:
Provided further, that it shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under this
paragraph for an employer to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any organization or entity
of any kind, in which employees participate, to address matters of mutual interest, including issues
of quality, productivity and efficiency, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority to
negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements with the employer or to amend existing
collective bargaining agreements between the employer and any labor organization.
Although the Bill would have amended Section 8(a)(2) the language would also effectively have amended Section
2(5).
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non-supporting employee interests are to yield and to financially support the union to the limits
of a representational ceiling. As one is often told in discussions of employment at will, one is
always “free” to quit.234 This is a rational if sometimes scorned free-rider policy. ALT-Labor—
though it is hard to speak of it monolithically—appears to be entirely voluntary under any
reasonable definition of the term. No employee is required to join or support it as a condition of
employment. Arguably, then, it represents a “free market” alternative to unionism, even if it is
unclear whether it is an actual alternative since at this early date it has not delivered much more
than positive public relations for low wage workers. Still, such groups seem evocative of a
certain 19th century élan, a panache that might have been embraced by Samuel Gompers and the
“libertarians” of his day.235 The groups are supported by private money—Citizens United money
—and not by the State.
Labor advocates will continue to see in attempts to loosen the Section 2(5) and 8(a)(2)
lockbox threats to unions’ bargaining exclusivity. There are two immediate responses to this
concern. First, either unions want to help ALT-Labor or they do not. If it is the former they will
have to eventually address the labor organization vulnerability on display in this article. Second,
if the underlying dynamic of the labor relationship is fundamentally adversarial and inevitable
unions have nothing to fear from nonunion participatory schemes. The model cannot lead
anywhere under that assumption because, at the end of the day, the boss will not give up
anything significantly affecting the bottom line. Once workers are organized in their “action
committees,” and see what is not happening, they may be more inclined to wonder what happens
next than if they had never been in such a group. Unions might find themselves in a good
position to call the participatory bluff and dare management to allow authentic competition
between unions and committees. Perhaps unions will find ways to access employees
participating in internal groups to help them leverage an ongoing credible threat of independent
unionism.236 This may sharpen unions and employees alike in an even broader “School for
Democracy,”237 and put to rest conservative claims that unions fear competition and insist upon
monopoly. Given the overall weakness of labor law, what do unions really have to lose?
The time seems opportune for a compromise. Organized labor and business should push
jointly for a narrowing of the section 2(5) definition and make certain that the definition means
in practice that the now-and-future ALT-Labor is not subject to liability under the secondary
boycott provisions of the NLRA. Michael LeRoy has proposed the following amendment of
Section 8(a)(2):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section, it shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice for an employer to form or maintain a
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committee in which employees participate to at least the same extent practicable
as representatives of management participate to discuss with it matters of mutual
interest, including grievances, wages, hours of employment and other working
conditions, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority to be the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees or to enter into collective bargaining
agreements between the employer and any labor organization, except that in a
case in which a labor organization is the representative of such employees as
provided in section 9(a), this proviso shall not apply.238
My proposal would first be to accept this language, which essentially keeps intact the
broad definition of a labor organization but partially insulates the employer from
violations in connection with it. However, I would go further to make clear that the
conceptual structure identified in the language, a group that “does not have, claim, or
seek authority to be the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees or to enter
into collective bargaining agreements between the employer and any labor
organization”—a structure that would seem to include much of ALT-Labor—be similarly
insulated from liability under Section 8(b)(4)(B).
CONCLUSION
The transparent reasons for the emergence of ALT-Labor groups is the reality of weak labor
law protections for employees and the broad formation of a transient precariat. In this
environment unions have been unable to gain traction. But labor law, with all its weaknesses and
maddening irrelevance in certain contexts, has prohibitory dimensions that must not be ignored.
For some observers ALT-Labor represents the potential for a reinvigorated labor movement and
an energized precariat. For others, ALT-Labor represents, at least with respect to low wage
workers, an exercise in futility—no amount of pressure, they claim, will force employers to pay
wages and benefits that the market simply will not bear. To an observer of labor history,
however, ALT-Labor is a vulnerable, fragile phenomenon likely to be dealt with—if agitation
intensifies—as militant labor has always been dealt with in the United States: injunctions and
civil actions, one way or another, are likely to rain down upon the heads of the actors. Secondary
boycott prohibitions are an engine that could quite possibly drive such litigation. Workers
flouting secondary boycott prohibitions would be engaging in civil disobedience. Civil
disobedience will always have its risks and costs, but defiance in the face of the risk is a course
some might choose. However, the risks should be understood. Communicating the nature of the
risk is not arguing against its legitimacy.
Nevertheless the pragmatic conclusion of this article is that ALT-Labor groups would be well
advised to disavow in explicit terms any purpose of negotiating with employers. The better
course is to train workers in discreet workplaces how they can engage in negotiations. Such a
disavowal should diminish but not eliminate arguments that an ALT-Labor group’s purpose is to
“deal with” employers. It would have to be followed by conduct from which a “pattern and
practice” of interacting with employers was found insufficiently pervasive for a legal fact finder
to discover a “bilateral mechanism.” It is reasonable to think that courts will not be quick to
238 LeRoy, Employee Participation at 1708. As Professor LeRoy explains, the proposal is an amalgam of sections
of the Team Act and of a committee proposal arising during the Taft-Hartley deliberations. Id. at 1706-1707

equate “pure” protest directed at an employer with a “dealing with” purpose sufficient to create
labor organization status, thereby exposing ALT-Labor to secondary boycott liability. Thus, ALTLabor should be careful to direct its protest message to the general public wherever possible.
More broadly, “outside” civil society groups are becoming increasingly invested in ALTLabor, which represents one face of the precariat. Restricting ALT-Labor conduct that might, if
engaged in by a union, violate the NLRA is an altogether different exercise than regulating
“industrial strife.” One hopes that such restrictions would be undertaken, if at all, only with the
greatest caution and subjected to strict scrutiny. A good way to avoid impacts on the broader civil
society is to ensure that ALT-Labor is not subjected to the secondary boycott provisions of the
NLRA. Whether or not organized labor and business can negotiate some kind of deal that
Congress would be willing to enact, it is in the broader public interest that the government not be
permitted to further conflate traditional labor regulation with historically protected speech and
protest. One cannot wonder at why the precariat is agitated. It should be permitted, in a free
society, to express its dissatisfaction with the status quo.

